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Abstract 
My research explores important issues associated with development and growth. 
Chapter 1 aims to obtain an accurate estimate of China's intergenerational income 
mobility and to present evidence on its distributional pattern. Using panel data from the 
China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) over the period 1989—2009, I find that 
China is less mobile than most developed countries. Then, I employ five different 
approaches to investigate the distributional pattern of China's intergenerational mobility 
across income levels. The results suggest that poor families have relatively high 
mobility, indicating opportunities for the poor children to escape poverty. Finally, I 
show that while wealthy fathers are likely to pass on their favorable economic status to 
their sons, rich sons come from a very wide range of family economic backgrounds. 
In the second chapter of my dissertation, conspicuous consumption in China is 
studied. Conspicuous consumption, also called visible expenditures, conveys higher 
socioeconomic status and may help individuals differentiate themselves in the marriage 
market when there is competition for partners and imperfect information. I examine a 
unique dataset of automobile purchasers in China to investigate the extent to which 
skewed sex ratios influence expenditure decisions for this highly visible commodity. 
Using a triple difference approach, I show that unmarried male consumers who face an 
unfavorable sex ratio purchase more expensive, luxury vehicles than their married peers. 
Lower income borrowers and those residing in regions with the worst sex ratios exhibit 
the largest relative degree of conspicuous consumption. In addition to the direct cost of 
consumption signaling, I demonstrate this behavior generates negative externalities in 
the form of lower average fuel economy and higher average vehicle weight. As it has 
xi 
 
worsened sex ratios, status competition and the associated negative repercussions I 
identify represent unintended consequences of China’s one-child policy. 
Chapter 3 evaluates the causal effect of equity market liberalization in sixty-five 
countries that have adopted this policy during 1980-2011. While previous research has 
been devoted to liberalization cases prior to 2000, I extend the data through 2011, which 
leads to a roughly 50% increase in the number of cases. I first replicate the results in 
Bekaert et al. (2005) and then extend their analysis to the present. I find that the 
previously estimated growth effects remain significant in the updated sample. Next, I 
seek to address issues of endogenous policy selection that existing literature has failed 
to handle adequately. To do this, I model the liberalization decisions using a Cox 
proportional hazard regression and combine propensity score matching with difference-
in-difference methods to obtain an unbiased estimate of the treatment effects of 
liberalization. My results suggest that equity market liberalizations generate growth 
effects that are far more persistent than previously documented. 
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    Chapter 1: The Sins of the Fathers: Intergenerational Income 
Mobility in China 
1.1. Introduction and Literature 
Income inequality has always been a major concern for both economists and 
politicians. One way to measure inequality is to examine the income distribution at a 
given point in time, typically using cross-sectional data. On the other hand, 
intergenerational income mobility deals with the way current inequality is passed to the 
next generation. 
There is a large body of literature exploring intergenerational mobility, much of 
which focuses on fathers and sons in the US. The conventional approach is to estimate 
the intergenerational income elasticity (IGE) which gives an answer to the question: If 
the father's lifetime income is one percent higher than the average of his generation, by 
how many percentage points will his son's lifetime income exceed the average of the 
second generation. The IGE is a mirror image of the intergenerational income mobility. 
They are inversely related to each other. In the following paper, both of these terms will 
be used. 
Most of the early papers find the IGE in the USA to be about 0.2. However, in later 
research, people point out that the single-year measure of father's earnings induces an 
attenuation bias given that it is a poor proxy for the permanent income. As a result, they 
use better data such as Panel Study of Income Dynamics (Solon, 1992) and National 
Longitudinal Surveys of Labor Market Experience (Zimmerman, 1992) and replace the 
single-year father's earnings with averages of father's earnings taken over three to five 
years. They conclude that the IGE in the USA over the long run is around 0.4. More 
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recently, Mazumder (2005) argues that even 0.4 has been biased down by 30% due to 
the persistent transitory income fluctuations and that the USA is substantially less 
mobile than people have thought. 
Compared with the research on the USA, many studies find higher mobility in 
other OECD countries such as Sweden, Germany, Finland, Norway, Spain, and 
Canada.
1
 But there are two exceptions: Great Britain’s IGE almost reaches 0.6 when IV 
regression is employed (Dearden et al., 1997); and the IGE in Italy is estimated to be 
0.55 or 0.44, depending on the definition of income used (Piraino, 2007). 
However, only a very limited number of papers focus on the less developed 
countries due to the paucity of data. According to these studies, mobility appears to be 
lower on average in developing countries such as Brazil, Ecuador and Peru (Andrade et 
al., 2004; Grawe, 2004; Dunn, 2007; Gong et al., 2012). Table 1.1 provides the main 
findings of relevant papers. 
In recent years, there have been a number of works regarding China's 
intergenerational mobility, but as of yet there is no consensus. The estimates of China's 
IGE range from around 0.3 to 0.63 (Guo and Min, 2008; Gong et al., 2012; Fan et al., 
2013; Yuan and Lin, 2013). The broad range of IGE estimates probably result from 
different samples, sample selection rules, econometric model specifications and 
definitions of income. 
Aside from obtaining estimates of the IGE in each country, researchers are also 
interested in the distributional pattern of intergenerational mobility across income levels. 
However, the literature on this topic is still very small. To my knowledge, only five 
                                                 
       
1
See Bjorklund and Jantti, 1997; Couch and Dunn, 1997; Corak and Heisz, 1999; Osterbacka, 2001; 
Bratburg et al., 2005 and Pascual, 2009. 
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papers carefully examine the issue econometrically.
2
 In these studies, Eide and 
Showalter (1999) and Andrade et al. (2004) perform quantile regressions. Interestingly, 
The USA is found to have a generally decreasing IGE while Brazil is almost the 
opposite. Corak and Heisz (1999) use a nonparametric model and find that income 
mobility in Canada is higher at the lower end of the income distribution than on the top 
and in the middle. Finally, Bjorklude et al. (2012) use linear spline regressions to show 
that for the 0.1-percent richest Swedish families, fathers' economic status is highly 
transmissible to their sons. Figure 1.1 summarizes these findings.
3
    
My paper is the first one to study in depth how intergenerational mobility varies 
across income levels in China. Using a diversity of methods, I find that poor families 
enjoy higher mobility, which may give people more confidence in China’s poverty 
reduction. On the other hand, whereas wealthy fathers tend to give rise to wealthy sons, 
wealthy sons can come from a broad range of family economic backgrounds. 
The remainder of this paper will be organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the 
data and sample selection rules, Section 3 estimates China's overall IGE, Section 4 
investigates its distributional pattern, and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
1.2. Data and Sample Selection 
The data are from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), which was 
conducted by the Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina at 
                                                 
       
2
Although there are many papers approaching the distributional pattern problem using transition 
matrices, they all reach similar conclusions due to an innate flaw of the matrix. I will discuss and correct 
the flaw in section 4. 
       
3
Grawe (2004) applies two-sample-two-stage-least-squares (TS2SLS) quantile regressions and 
estimated the IGE distribution patterns for several countries. Since most of their samples are quite small, I 
do not show the graphs. 
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Chapel Hill and the Chinese National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety. The survey 
covers a total of nine provinces in China including Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Shandong 
Liaoning, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and Guizhou, and has had eight waves, 
collected in 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009 respectively. In each 
wave of the survey, approximately 200 communities, 4000 households, and 26000 
individuals were interviewed. The participants were asked about health and nutrition 
conditions, medical care, family planning, demography, education, socioeconomic 
status, among other things. This micro longitudinal data set has proven to be 
representative and reliable (Wang, 2007), and is regarded as one of the best resources to 
investigate Chinese households and communities.  
There are advantages and limitations regarding the data. The advantages are: first, it 
is a longitudinal data set that spans twenty years. If a person takes the survey in multiple 
years, researchers will be able to have a better knowledge of that person’s income trend 
and lifetime income. Second, it collects information on individuals whether or not they 
are still residing in the same household with their families. Therefore, it does not suffer 
from the co-residing bias. The biggest shortcoming of the data, however, is that not 
every household participates in the survey from 1989 to 2009. Households may exit the 
survey for reasons that researchers may not know although the data do tell researchers 
when an individual leaves the sample due to death. New households will enter to 
replace the old ones so that the total number of families and individuals interviewed is 
similar in each wave. Thus, the sample includes households whose survey years may be 
different. To address this issue, I only use the households that stay in the survey for 
more than 16 years so that they are from roughly the same period. 
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I utilize the family member relationship file and individual’s gender information to 
identify all the father-son cases. Sons who are enrolled in school and fathers who have 
retired are excluded from the sample. When calculating permanent incomes, years with 
negative or zero incomes are not considered. This step is justified by more than a 
computational issue. Reports of abnormally low incomes are most likely to be a result 
of measurement errors and using these values could incorrectly assign the 
corresponding individuals a very low lifetime income. The problems regarding missing 
values are always salient when dealing with survey data. In this study, I do not exclude 
individuals who fail to have a complete income series. For example, if one out of eight 
years is missing when calculating the eight-wave average, I use the average of the 
remaining seven years. This exercise is consistent with Osterberg (2000) and Bratberg 
(2005). However, I drop fathers who have fewer than five income observations to 
ensure that the average incomes can approximate the lifetime incomes. Finally, 
following Couch and Dunn (1997) and Mazumder (2005), if more than one son is 
matched to a father, all sons who satisfy the screening rules are retained to have a larger 
sample size.
4
 After all the restrictions are imposed on the data, the final sample size is 
reduced to 1407 father-son pairs, which is fairly small compared with the raw data. I 
acknowledge that there might be a representativeness issue associated with the small 
final sample used in the regressions. Table 1.2 reports the summary statistics of the key 
variables. Here, the concept “Income” is defined as incomes from all sources including 
job earnings (calculated as the product of monthly earnings and the number of months a 
person worked in a given year), annual bonus and other cash or non-cash incomes. It is 
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The standard errors are adjusted for within-household correlation. If the sample is restricted to the 
oldest son in the household, there are fewer observations, but the results are largely unchanged.  
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then adjusted to the 2009 price level using the consumer price indices. It shows that the 
sons earn more than the fathers on average. Sons are much better educated than fathers, 
probably due to the 9-year compulsory education since 1986 and the increasing return 
on human capital in the last decades (Yuan and Lin, 2013). The average age is about 24 
for the sons and 53 for the fathers in 2000.  
 
1.3. China’s Overall Mobility 
1.3.1. Empirical Model 
I use a Galton-Becker-Solon equation as the baseline regression model. It is a 
conventional specification in the literature (Solon, 1992; Solon, 2002): 
 
(1)                                               Y 
son 
i = α + β ∙ Y 
father 
i + εi. 
 
In equation (1), Y denotes the natural logarithm of mean income. As commonly done by 
other studies, I also control for the son's and father's age and age squared to account for 
their different stages in the life cycle. The coefficient of interest β is the IGE, which 
indicates the extent to which father's permanent income level affects his son's. The 
higher the β, the more likely sons will inherit father's economic position and the lower 
the intergenerational mobility. In the extreme, when β equals zero, father's income has 
no bearing on the son's and there exists perfect income mobility. In contrast, if β is 
greater than or equal to one, not only economic status tends to be passed down to the 
next generation, but the income distribution fails to regress to the mean. 
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The regression investigates the net effect of father's income on the son's through 
any possible channels, obviating the need to include other control variables on the right-
hand side without incurring the missing variable bias. But researchers have been trying 
different ways to handle the attenuation bias caused by the measurement error in father's 
permanent income. Single-year income is not a good proxy as it consists of both 
permanent income and transitory fluctuations (Solon, 1992; Solon, 2002; Mazumder, 
2005). Three methods to mitigate the bias have been recommended. One is to take the 
average of the incomes across several years (usually 3 to 5 years) to get a more accurate 
measure of permanent income (Solon, 1992; Zimmerman, 1992; Bjorklund et al., 2012). 
However, Mazumder (2005) argues that the 5-year average income still suffers from 
large measurement error, as transitory fluctuations are probably persistent. Second, if 
longitudinal income data are not available, instrumental variable regressions can be 
used. Among the most well-known IVs are a father's education (Solon, 1992; Dearden 
et al., 1997) and a father's social or economic status (Zimmerman, 1992; Dearden et al., 
1997). These two instruments have fewer transitory fluctuations than the current 
incomes. Using them as the IVs alleviates the downward bias. IV regression, however, 
is also problematic in that the IV may be invalid. Take the father's education level as an 
example: if a father's education is somehow positively correlated with his son's income 
after controlling for his own income, the IGE will be overestimated. The third method 
uses the two-sample two-stage least squares (TS2SLS) procedure (Bjorklund and Jantti, 
1997; Dunn, 2007). Three steps are taken. First, the relationship between permanent 
income and personal characteristics is established using a complementary data set. Then, 
with the estimated relationship, father's lifetime income can be predicted using 
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characteristics in the primary data set. Finally, the child's income is regressed on the 
predicted father's income. 
The measurement error in the son's income does not in and of itself cause biases, 
but many researchers still choose to average their incomes across years to gain greater 
efficiency (Gustafsson, 1994; Couch and Dunn, 1997; Mazumder, 2005). Another issue 
regarding the regression is that the IGE tends to be biased downwards when the sons are 
at the beginning stage of their career (Solon, 2002; Haider and Solon, 2006). The 
correction of this problem is to only use sons within a specific range of age, typically 
from their late 20s to early 40s, or to average their earnings only in their latest years in 
the data such that the current income is close to the lifetime income (Gustafsson, 1994; 
Jantti and Osterbacka, 1999; Bjorklund and Jantti, 1997). 
I follow the literature and use the average income across all available years as a 
measure of father’s lifetime income. For the sons, I take the average of their incomes 
between 25 and 40 years old. I also run regressions using sons of all ages to take 
advantage of the larger sample size.  
Additionally, I perform IV regressions for comparison. The instrumental variables I 
use are father's years of education and the average income within father's occupation. 
The former IV is the most commonly used in the literature. The rationale for the latter 
one is that fathers' incomes are highly correlated with their occupations, but the 
occupation itself does not directly affect their sons' income. As such, the exclusion 
condition is well satisfied. However, note that if father's occupation has predicting 
power of son's occupation, which affects son's income, the result will be biased upwards. 
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In this sense, the IV regressions provide an upper bound of β. The first-stage regression 
shown in Table 1.3 indicates that the IV is very strong. 
 
1.3.2. Results 
Table 1.4 presents all of the results. OLS using sons of all ages indicates that 
China's IGE is approximately 0.5. Restricting the sample to older sons reduces the 
estimate to about 0.4. As has been found in the literature, using IV regressions increases 
the estimates substantially, to between 0.59 and 0.80. Given that OLS tends to 
underestimate and IV regression tends to overestimate the IGE, the true value may lie 
between 0.5 and 0.6. In addition, since the majority of the fathers have income 
observations in 7 or 8 waves out of a total of 8 waves, the average income should be 
quite representative of their long-run incomes and the measurement error is supposed to 
be effectively wiped out.
5
 As such, China's IGE is likely to lean toward the OLS end, 
and settle near 0.5. By comparing the results from OLS and IV regressions with the 
corresponding estimates in Table 1.1, I find that China's IGE is greater than those of 
most developed nations, especially the Scandinavian countries. The implied low 
mobility might be due to more nepotism and rent-seeking in recent years in China 
(Yuan and Lin, 2013). 
There are big differences between China’s urban economy and rural economy in 
many aspects. To explore whether it is true for income mobility, I split the sample into 
urban subsample and rural subsample according to father’s residence and estimate the 
IGE for these two areas respectively. Since the number of observations (especially for 
                                                 
       
5
On average, fathers report their incomes 6.65 times, with the survey waves spanning 17.71 years. 
About 60% of fathers have 7 or 8 income observations. 
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the urban areas) is fairly small, I use sons of all ages in the regressions to maintain a 
reasonable sample size. Table 1.5 reports the OLS results. It turns out that the urban 
households have a much higher IGE than the rural ones. It is not unexpected given that 
tens of millions of Chinese rural people, most of whom are young men (second 
generation), have migrated into cities to work in the manufacturing industry during the 
past two decades, which improved their earnings and weakened the link between 
father’s and son’s incomes. A further investigation into the data confirms this 
phenomenon: 84% of the urban working sons live at home while the number for rural 
working sons is only 62%. 
 
1.4. The Distributional Pattern of Income Mobility 
One interesting question concerning mobility is whether rich parents and poor 
parents have an equal effect on their children's future incomes. If not, the mean IGE 
misses a lot of information. 
Previous papers have adopted five different approaches (transition matrix, linear 
spline regression, nonparametric regression, quantile regression and instrumental 
quantile regression) to examine the distributional pattern of mobility in other countries. 
In the following section, I apply all these methods to study this question in China. It is 
important to maintain a relatively large sample size because all of these methods allow 
mobility to vary across cohorts. Thus, I do not impose restrictions on son’s ages. It may 
bias the estimates of mobility upwards, but to the extent that every cohort is similarly 
affected, it will not change its distribution pattern. 
 
11 
 
1.4.1. Transition Matrix 
One of the most popular methods of addressing this question is with the use of a 
transition matrix (Jarvis and Jenkins, 1998; Corak and Heisz, 1999; Bratberg et al., 
2005; Shi et al., 2010). Using my data, I construct the following quintile matrix: 
It is notable that for the richest and poorest parents, their children are more likely to 
maintain the same income level while children with parents who fall in the middle 
groups enjoy much more income mobility. For example, about 43% ((5, 5) entry of the 
matrix) of the sons born to top rich fathers will end up being the richest as well. On the 
contrary, for the three middle-income cohorts, the probability of children having the 
same income status as their parents is well below 30%. 
However, people are concerned that the way the matrix is constructed guarantees 
higher numbers at the end points and smaller numbers in the middle (Atkinson et al., 
1983; Corak and Heisz, 1999).
6
 This ceiling/floor problem is recognized in the early 
1980s; unfortunately, researchers keep using the matrix without trying to address this 
flaw. 
In this paper, to address this concern, I take two steps to modify the matrix. First, I 
divide parents and children into ten groups respectively and expand the matrix to a 
10×10 one. The transition matrix becomes: 
                                                 
       
6
Consider a father in the lowest quintile. If his son's income improves substantially, this father-son 
observation will wind up in a position of (1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4) or (1, 5) entry in the matrix, depending on 
the extent of the enhancement. In contrast, if the son has a worsened income compared to other children, 
no matter how poor the situation is, he will still stay in (1,1) of the matrix. The situation is different for a 
middle-class family because they will not stay on the diagonal of the matrix whenever the son has a 
considerable change in his income, either richer or poorer. For example, a son with third-grade parents 
could move to (3, 4) or (3, 5) if he enjoys a higher earning, or switch to (3, 1) or (3, 2) if he makes less 
money. In other words, the poorest and the richest have only one direction of change while people in 
between can go either way. 
12 
 
It is conspicuous that the top decile (the (10, 10) entry) has an exceptionally large 
number, much larger than its bottom counterpart, indicating a lower mobility for the 
richest families than the poorest families. As a second step, I define a new concept 
called “relatively stable”. It means that the son's income either stays in the same decile 
as his father's income or moves to the neighboring deciles. For instance, the probability 
that a father in the bottom 10% stays “relatively stable” is the sum of the (1, 1) and (1, 2) 
entries whereas the chance of a “second to poorest” father (10%-20%) remaining 
“relatively stable” is the sum of the (2, 1), (2, 2) and (2, 3) entries of the matrix. As such, 
the ceiling/floor effect associated with the richest and poorest families is counteracted 
by only adding up two numbers as opposed to three. Table 1.8 and Figure 1.2 
summarize these probabilities for all the ten subgroups. 
The large numbers for the top 20% families imply that sons with rich fathers can 
easily inherit their favorable economic status. It should not be surprising as wealthy 
parents have more power and resources to transmit their income advantages. On the 
other hand, people in the left tail (lowest decile) of the income distribution enjoy 
relatively high mobility. This pattern comes as a consolation since it means that the 
moving up mechanism is not blocked for children from poor families. Given that the 
rural areas are typically poorer than the urban areas, this distributional pattern is also 
consistent with the previous finding that mobility in the rural areas is higher than in the 
urban areas. 
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1.4.2. Linear Spline Regression  
The second method I use is linear spline regression. It allows the slope of the 
regression line to change at each pre-defined breakpoint (called knot), which can be 
designated arbitrarily. The regression yields a series of coefficients in each interval 
created by any two neighboring knots. By observing these coefficients, one is able to 
know how the coefficient of interest varies across the quantiles of the explanatory 
variable. Mathematically, suppose we separate the regressor into two pieces connected 
at z, and y is piecewise regressed on x, the regression equation would be: 
 
 (2)                                              yi = α + β ∙ xi + γ ∙ (xi - z) + εi.        
 
In this paper, I define the knots as the 20
th
, 40
th
, 60
th
 and 80
th
 percentiles of father's log 
average income. I do not divide it into finer pieces because the coefficients will become 
overly volatile when the sections are small. The results are presented in Table 1.9 and 
Figure 1.3. Generally speaking, the IGE is the lowest for the bottom twenty percent 
fathers and rises to about 0.7 before declining slightly to 0.56 for the top twenty percent. 
This pattern also indicates greater mobility for the poor families than the wealthy 
families as is suggested by the transition matrix.  
 
1.4.3. Nonparametric Regression 
Nonparametric technique allows very flexible coefficients throughout. It does not 
make assumptions about the functional form of the relationship between the dependent 
and independent variables. 
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There are various specifications for nonparametric regressions. In this work, I adopt 
kernel weighted local polynomial smoothing, set the degree of the polynomial equal to 
3 for the functional form, choose Epanechnikov kernel, set the bandwidth equal to 0.8 
and abandon the outliers at the left tail as they are not likely to represent people's 
lifetime income.
7
 The result is shown in Figure 1.4 where the blue line is the fitted line. 
Since the horizontal axis and vertical axis represent log mean father's income and log 
mean son's income respectively, the slope of the fitted line (which is also the derivative 
of log mean son's income with respect to log mean father's income), is the estimated 
IGE. It is obvious that the slope starts being zero or even negative in the first place. 
Then it turns positive and grows monotonically until around the midpoint. After that, 
the slope keeps roughly constant. It implies that the poor families are more mobile than 
the rich ones. This pattern further corroborates the findings in 4.1 and 4.2. 
Summing up the results so far, the transition matrix, the linear spline regression, 
and the nonparametric regression all suggest considerably higher income mobility for 
the poor than for the rich. However, the implications for the middle-income families are 
not consistent across methods. The transition matrix shows that the IGE for the middle 
class is somewhat lower than for the poorest and much lower than for the richest group; 
the nonparametric regression indicates a higher IGE for the middle class than for the 
poorest, but there does not seem to be much difference between the rich and the middle 
class; finally, the spline regression shows that the IGE for the middle class is much 
higher than the poor and is even slightly higher than the richest group. The noise in the 
middle-income cohort could come from different econometric models and from the fact 
                                                 
       
7
I have also used other nonparametric regressions such as locally weighted scatterplot smoothing 
(Lowess), and experimented with other bandwidths and kernels. The results are similar. 
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that the sample is not particularly large. The only conclusion that can be safely drawn 
from all three methods is that there is greater mobility for the poor than for the rich. 
 
1.4.4. Quantile Regression 
The remaining two methods to explore the distributional pattern of mobility are 
Quantile Regression and Instrumental Quantile Regression. Quantile regression has a 
few favorable properties compared with least squares. It does not require any 
distributional assumption of the error term and is robust to extreme values and outliers. 
This attribute is especially important for handling survey data since unusually large or 
small incomes are not rare. Another advantage is that it utilizes all the observations 
when computing the coefficients for each quantile without diminishing the sample size. 
This property is particularly useful for studying the distribution pattern of the IGE as 
people do not need to worry about the subsamples being too small. 
The results of the quantile regression and IV quantile regressions are reported in 
Table 1.10 and Figure 1.5. A common feature these regressions share is that the richest 
sons happen to have low IGE and hence high mobility. The generally growing mobility 
across son's incomes (except for the lowest decile) is in accordance with Eide and 
Showalter (1999) who find a similar pattern in the USA. 
 
1.4.5. Reconciliation of Different Results 
Quantile regressions demonstrate that rich families end up with low 
intergenerational elasticity, which is at odds with what is implied by the transition 
matrix, the linear spline regression, and the nonparametric regression. To reconcile 
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these results, first note that quantile regressions group people according to son's income 
whereas other methods are all based on father's income. They look at the problem from 
different perspectives.  
Figure 1.6 provides a technical explanation of why decreasing IGE from quantile 
regressions and increasing IGE from a non-quantile regression can actually coexist. 
Suppose the observations are evenly distributed like a right triangle in the graph. 
According to the definition of quantile regression, the fitted line of a particular quantile 
in this case is simply a straight line that connects the series of points associated with a 
given quantile value for the dependent variable at each value of the independent 
variable. At the rightmost point of the triangle, every quantile value clusters there. Thus, 
all quantile regression lines must cross that point. It can be shown that the slope of the 
regression line decreases as the quantile gets higher (In the graph, the 80th percentile 
line must be flatter than the 20th percentile line. When the quantile reaches the upper 
bound 100
th
 percentile, the slope is zero). By contrast, if the sample is divided 
conditional on the independent variable, and OLS is conducted in each subsample, the 
fitted line will start from being flat (in the left extreme, the slope is zero) and becomes 
steeper as the independent variable increases. Actually, Figure 1.4 depicts the 
distribution of the observations, which does look somewhat like the triangle described 
above. 
A potential economic reason for the high income mobility associated with the 
wealthiest sons is that they may come from a broad range of economic backgrounds, 
such that the father's income does not have large explanatory power in regards to son's 
income. To test whether this is the case, I calculate the standard deviation of log father's 
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average income for sons of different income levels. Note that taking the natural log 
takes care of heteroscedasticity in the father's income. Table 1.11 shows that fathers of 
the richest sons (top 2 deciles) indeed have a broader range of incomes than other 
fathers except for the poorest cohort. This should come as no surprise because China’s 
opening-up and reform policy, the adoption of the market economy and the compulsory 
education have given Chinese young men a great number of opportunities to build 
wealth, even if they do not come from rich families. 
Finally, integrating the results from all these econometric techniques, one may 
conclude that: on one hand, rich parents can easily pass wealth to the next generation 
(according to the non-quantile regression methods); on the other hand, young men have 
various ways other than being born into an affluent family to become wealthy 
(according to the quantile regressions).  
 
1.4.6. Comparing the Methods 
There is no answer as to which method should be used when studying the 
distributional pattern of the IGE. However, it helps to keep in mind the shortcomings of 
each method. 
Transition matrix suffers from two drawbacks. One is the ceiling/floor effect as is 
mentioned above. The second is missing information on ages of both fathers and sons, 
which can be problematic. Solon (2002) and Haider and Solon (2006) show that the 
IGE tends to be underestimated if sons are very young while Grawe (2004) illustrates 
that estimates of IGE are negatively correlated to father's age. 
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Linear spline regression allows people to choose the knots (specifying intervals) 
arbitrarily. However, the result is very sensitive to the choice of the knots. Poorly 
selected knots can result in exceptionally large coefficients at the cost of unusually 
small or even negative coefficients for the neighboring intervals. 
Nonparametric regression also fails to directly control for ages. Besides, the best-
fitting line may be affected by the outliers in the tails of the distribution. Finally, setting 
parameters may be challenging. 
Quantile regression approaches a problem from the angle of the dependent variable, 
making it seemingly contradictory to other methods sometimes. 
In sum, every method has its own drawbacks. Even with the same data, different 
methods can generate very different results. In the absence of theories, one should be 
very careful about putting too much weight on any single result; Robustness checks are 
necessary. It may be worthwhile to adopt multiple methods to get a range of coefficients 
before making conclusions. 
 
1.5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper explores intergenerational income mobility and its distributional pattern 
in China using a longitudinal sample. I find that China's IGE is likely to be between 0.5 
and 0.6, which hints that China has less mobility than most of the developed countries. 
This conclusion is in line with the conjecture that developing countries provide people 
with less equal opportunity and are thus less mobile. Additionally, I adopt a variety of 
strategies to investigate the distribution of income mobility across income levels. It 
turns out that the modified transition matrix, the linear spline regression, and the 
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nonparametric regression end up telling a fairly consistent story that the poor 
households in China are much more mobile than the rich, which implies opportunities 
for the poor children to escape poverty. However, quantile regression uncovers a 
different pattern that rich sons are actually a highly mobile cohort. Combining all the 
information I conclude that in China, while wealthy parents can easily make their 
children wealthy, there are plenty of ways for a child to become rich. Being born into an 
affluent family is not the only one.  
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Table 1.1: Selected Literature on the Estimates of the IGE in Different Countries 
      Notes: TSIV represents two stage IV regression.
Country Study Methodology Estimated IGE 
Developed 
Countries 
   
Canada Corak and Heisz (1999) OLS About 0.2 
Finland Osterbacka (2001) OLS 0.13 
France Lefranc and Trannoy (2005) TSIV About 0.4 
Germany Couch and Dunn (1997) OLS 0.12 if sons are 18+ 
0.30 if sons are 25+ 
Great Britain Dearden et al. (1997) OLS, IV 0.24 using OLS, 0.39-0.44 using 
OLS with predicted wages, 0.56-
0.59 using IV 
Italy Piraino (2007) TS2SLS 0.55 or 0.44 depending on the 
definition of income 
Norway Bratburg et al. (2005) OLS 0.129 for cohorts born in 1950; 
0.155 for cohorts born in 1960 
Spain Pascual (2009) OLS and IV 0.32 using OLS; 0.41 using IV 
Sweden Bjorklund and Jantti (1997) TS2SLS 0.28 
Sweden Osterberg (2000) OLS 0.13 
USA  Solon (1992) OLS and IV 0.41 using OLS; 
0.53 using IV and single-year 
income in 1967 
USA  Mazumder (2005) Tobit Around 0.6 
Developing 
Countries 
   
Brazil Andrade et al. (2003) TSIV 0.60 
Brazil Dunn (2007) TSIV, OLS, IV 0.69 using TSIV;0.53 using 
OLS;0.69 using IV 
China 
(urban) 
Gong et al. (2012) TS2SLS 0.56 for all children; 0.63 for 
children aged 30-42 
China Fan et al. (2013) OLS 0.32 for cohorts born between 
1949 1970, 0.44 for cohort after 
1970 
Ecuador Grawe (2004) TSIV 1.13 
Malaysia Grawe (2004) TSIV 0.54 
Nepal Grawe (2004) TSIV 0.32 
Pakistan Grawe (2004) TSIV 0.24 
Peru Grawe (2004) TSIV 0.67 
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics 
Total Sample Mean Standard Deviation 
Number of Father-Son Pairs 1407  
Son Average Annual Income 
(2009 RMB) 
7029 13593 
 Age in 2000 24.1 6.7 
 Years of Education  9.28 2.5 
 Living at Home (1=yes) 0.66 0.48 
    
Father Average Annual Income 
(2009 RMB) 
5282 5514 
 Age in 2000 52.8 8.6 
 Years of Education  5.91 3.3 
Son’s Age is Restricted to 25-40 Years old Mean Standard Deviation 
Number of Father-Son Pairs 442  
Son Average Annual Income 
(2009 RMB) 
8402 11098 
 Age in 2000 28.1 5.5 
 Years of Education  9.68 2.8 
 Living at Home (1=yes) 0.78 0.41 
    
Father Average Annual Income 
(2009 RMB) 
4826 3782 
 Age in 2000 56.6 7.6 
 Years of Education 5.41 3.3 
        Source: China Health and Nutrition Survey (1989-2009). 
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Table 1.3: First-Stage Regressions for IV=Occupational Income 
Dependant Variable: Ln (Father’s Mean Income) 
 All Ages 25-40 Years Old 
Ln (Occupational Income) 0.295*** 
(0.03) 
0.351*** 
(0.05) 
R2 0.2324 0.3155 
F-test Statistic 84.84 40.19 
       Note: ***denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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  Table 1.4: Estimates of China’s Overall IGE 
 
 
Covariates 
Ages of Sons 
All ages 25-40 years old 
OLS IV:  
Father’s 
Education 
IV:  
Father’s 
Occupation  
OLS IV:  
Father’s 
Education 
IV: 
Occupation 
Ln (Father’s 
mean income) 
0.498*** 0.800*** 0.717*** 0.382*** 0.594* 0.682*** 
 (0.051) (0.227) (0.188) (0.071) (0.327) (0.230) 
Ageson -0.001 -0.012 -0.009 -0.214*** -0.186** -0.174** 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.073) (0.076) (0.083) 
Age2son 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003** 0.003** 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Agefather -0.073 -0.062 -0.065 0.097 0.096 0.095 
 (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.067) (0.068) (0.070) 
Age2father 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
F-statistic 29.32 11.01 11.65 20.87 13.51 15.67 
R2 0.108 0.081 0.094 0.237 0.217 0.196 
Observations 1407 1407 1407 442 442 442 
                      Notes:  
                      
a
The sample is from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) 1989-2009. 
                      
bDependant variable: Ln (son’s mean income). 
                  
c
Robust standard errors adjusted for within-household correlation are in brackets. ***, ** and *    
denote significance   at the 1%,   5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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  Table 1.5: Difference between the Urban and Rural Areas 
                      Notes:  
                      
a
OLS is employed. The dependant variable is the natural logarithm of son’s mean income. 
                      
b
Sons of all ages are used. 
                      
cRural/urban is defined by parents’ residence. 
             
d
Robust standard errors adjusted for within-household correlation are in brackets. ***, ** and *  
         denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               
  
                    Covariates                  Rural                      Urban 
      Ln (Father’s mean 
income) 
                 0.407*** 
                 (0.059) 
                   0.694*** 
                   (0.099) 
                        Ageson                  -0.016 
                 (0.040) 
                   0.062 
                   (0.059) 
                        Age
2
son                   0.001 
                 (0.001) 
                   -0.001 
                   (0.001) 
                        Agefather                  -0.053 
                 (0.049) 
                   -0.188* 
                   (0.107) 
                        Age
2
father                   0.004 
                 (0.004) 
                    0.002* 
                   (0.001) 
                     F-statistic                   17.19                     12.17 
                          R2                   0.075                     0.262 
                  Observations                   1189                       218 
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             Table 1.6: 5×5 Father-Son Income Transition Matrix 
 
  Son’s Income 
  Bottom Second Third Fourth Top 
  
F
at
h
er
’s
 I
n
co
m
e 
Bottom 0.326 0.259 0.216 0.135 0.064 
Second 0.212 0.283 0.226 0.155 0.124 
Third 0.196 0.206 0.210 0.221 0.167 
Fourth 0.159 0.155 0.223 0.244 0.219 
Top 0.107 0.096 0.125 0.246 0.427 
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       Table 1.7: 10×10 Father-Son Income Transition Matrix 
 
  Son’s Income 
  Botto
m 
2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th Top 
F
at
h
er
’s
 
In
co
m
e 
Bottom 0.170 0.170 0.128 0.099 0.170 0.064 0.050 0.078 0.035 0.035 
2nd 0.128 0.184 0.156 0.135 0.071 0.128 0.085 0.057 0.043 0.014 
3rd 0.098 0.098 0.140 0.147 0.112 0.112 0.091 0.077 0.070 0.056 
4th 0.107 0.121 0.136 0.143 0.064 0.164 0.079 0.064 0.064 0.057 
5th 0.136 0.114 0.143 0.100 0.100 0.064 0.114 0.071 0.050 0.107 
6th 0.071 0.071 0.078 0.092 0.142 0.113 0.135 0.121 0.092 0.085 
7th 0.077 0.092 0.085 0.056 0.113 0.092 0.134 0.134 0.162 0.099 
8th 0.085 0.064 0.071 0.099 0.106 0.113 0.106 0.085 0.121 0.149 
9th 0.057 0.043 0.057 0.071 0.093 0.064 0.100 0.171 0.193 0.150 
Top 0.071 0.043 0.007 0.057 0.050 0.043 0.106 0.113 0.234 0.277 
 
 
 
 
    Table 1.8: Probabilities of Being “Relatively Stable” 
0%-
10% 
10%-
20% 
20%-
30% 
30%- 
40% 
40%- 
50% 
50%- 
60% 
60%- 
70% 
70%- 
80% 
80%- 
90% 
90%- 
100% 
0.340 0.468 0.385 0.343 0.264 0.390 0.430 0.312 0.514 0.511 
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  Table 1.9: Linear Spline Regression Results 
Quantiles 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100% 
Estimates of the IGE 0.277 0.443 0.720 0.700 0.559 
F-statistic 
R2 
Observations 
19.46 
0.112 
1406 
    
 
 
 
 
  Table 1.10: Quantile Regression Results 
 IV Quantile Regressions 
 
 
Quantile 
 
Regular Quantile 
regression 
IV:  
Father’s Years of 
Education 
IV:  
Mean Occupational 
Income 
0.1 0.390*** 0.387*** 0.839*** 
0.2 0.574*** 0.870*** 0.826*** 
0.3 0.527*** 0.759*** 0.970*** 
0.4 0.569*** 0.886*** 0.863*** 
0.5 0.536*** 0.973*** 0.924*** 
0.6 0.485*** 0.782*** 0.670*** 
0.7 0.443*** 0.760*** 0.546*** 
0.8 0.437*** 0.589*** 0.587*** 
0.9 0.415*** 0.665*** 0.670*** 
                         Notes: ***denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 1.11: The Variation of Father’s Income for Different Groups of Sons 
Percentile 
of Son’s 
Income 
0%-
10% 
10%-
20% 
20%- 
30% 
30%- 
40% 
40%- 
50% 
50%- 
60% 
60%- 
70% 
70%- 
80% 
80%- 
90% 
90%- 
100% 
Std Dev  
of Log 
Father’s 
Income 
 
 
0.75 
 
 
0.64 
 
 
0.54 
 
 
0.63 
 
 
0.69 
 
 
0.60 
 
 
0.64 
 
 
0.63 
 
 
0.74 
 
 
0.69 
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   Figure 1.1: Distributional Patterns of the IGE in Other Countries 
 
       Notes: For USA and Brazil, quantile regressions are applied. So the horizontal axes represent 
quantiles of the children’s incomes. The remaining two use non-quantile regression techniques. The 
horizontal axis in the graph for Sweden represents quantiles of the parents while in the Canada case, it 
is father's log earnings. It is noteworthy that these results cannot be directly compared due to different 
econometric methods employed. As is shown in Section 4, quantile and non-quantile regressions 
could generate opposite results even if the same data set is used. 
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Figure 1.2: Results of the Modified Transition Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Results of the Linear Spline Regression 
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                                    Figure 1.4: Results of the Nonparametric Regression 
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                                      Figure 1.5: Results of the Quantile Regressions 
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Figure 1.6: Analysis of the Difference between Quantile and Piecewise Regression 
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Chapter 2: Marriage Market Matching and  
Conspicuous Consumption in China 
2.1. Introduction 
A preference for sons, coupled with the one child-policy, has combined to generate 
a relative shortage of females in China. Estimates from China’s Population Census 
suggests that for cohorts born over the period 1970-2000, males have grown in share 
from 51% to 57% of the total population (Qian, 2008, p1251). Estimates of the share of 
“missing women” in the country now exceed 40 million women (Bulte et al., 2011). 
Existing research has shown that these skewed sex ratios are producing widespread 
social and economic upheaval, including higher saving rates, ballooning housing prices 
(Wei and Zhang, 2011; Wei et al., 2012), higher rates of bachelorhood (Guilmoto, 
2011), and reduced overall welfare (Bhaskar, 2011). Recent research also suggests that 
spending on status goods appears to be growing in magnitude, even in poorer parts of 
rural China (Brown et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2012). 
In this paper, we investigate the extent to which skewed sex ratios influence 
expenditure decisions in a broad sample of roughly 24,000 automobile transactions 
across China over the period 2009-2011. Using a differences in differences in 
differences approach, we show that unmarried male consumers who reside in an area 
with an unfavorable sex ratio purchase more expensive vehicles than their married peers. 
We also identify specific luxury vehicle models and confirm that the cars purchased by 
these consumers are more likely to be classified as higher end models. 
The pressure generated by skewed sex-ratios on individuals to consume 
conspicuously may vary along a number of dimensions. We are able to explore two 
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sources of heterogeneity in our sample. First, we show that the estimated relationship is 
both larger in magnitude and more precisely estimated among the quartile of individuals 
living in areas with the most highly skewed sex ratios. Second, we find that the poorest 
quartile of unmarried males in our sample exhibit the largest changes in expenditure.8 
This result is consistent with a situation in which individuals of varying income (and 
potentially of varying reference groups) use different sets of commodities to signal 
wealth, as documented by Chai and Kaus (2012) for South African consumers. Finally, 
we investigate whether this behavior generates negative externalities in the form of 
lower average fuel economy and higher average vehicle weight, a factor that can 
significantly increase mortality in traffic accidents (Anderson and Auffhammer, 2014). 
Our results suggest that consumption signaling skews the pool of purchased 
automobiles to lower gas mileage vehicles, but has little impact on overall vehicle 
weight. 
The use of consumption expenditure to signal social status has attracted a great deal 
of attention in the economics literature. Recent work has focused on empirically 
identifying consumption visibility and exploring the determinants and motivations for 
signaling (Charles et al., 2009; Heffitz, 2011). These efforts routinely classify 
automobiles as among the most conspicuous of purchases and a number of papers focus 
specifically on vehicle purchases. For instance, Grinblatt et al. (2008) show that Finnish 
consumers are directly influenced by the automobile purchases of their nearest 
neighbors, particularly for recent purchases.  
                                                 
       
8
Our sample of car buyers is more affluent than the population at large. We explore the sample at 
length in Section 2. 
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Positional spending has also been studied in developing countries, with research 
highlighting the fact that the allocation of expenditure for this purpose has the potential 
to act as a poverty trap in this setting (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007; Brown et al., 2011; 
Moav and Neeman, 2010, 2012; Case et al., 2013; Kaus, 2013). These effects appear to 
be amplified by marriage market conditions. For instance, Chen et al., (2012) show that 
relative to families with daughters, poor Chinese households with sons undertake higher 
levels of social gift-giving associated with maintaining guanxi, networks of influence in 
Chinese society. 
Our analysis sample confers several unique advantages in this context. First, we 
examine expenditure on automobiles, a ubiquitous and highly visible commodity, with a 
range of purchase options, and for which signaling is often considered a major 
consumption motivation. Second, our study spans consumers across all of China, both 
rural and urban. Finally, because the data comes from a financial lender, our data 
contains information about the products purchased as well as detailed records on the 
consumers themselves.  
At the same time, because we are working with a very specific set of consumers 
and consumption decisions, the generalizability of the results we obtain may be limited. 
In particular, we are identifying a relationship between positional spending and 
marriage market competition within a subsample of Chinese car consumers, who are 
affluent enough to buy a car but both need to borrow to make their purchase and engage 
with this specific lender. Estimates from the 2011 Chinese Household Finance Survey 
suggest that roughly 27% of new car purchasers in China rely on credit. To the extent 
that richer households are less likely to need credit, our estimates are thus simply best 
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interpreted as the impact of the sex ratio among the population of purchasers who 
choose to employ credit. 
 Rates of private car ownership in China are low but are increasing rapidly. While 
in 1985 the rate of ownership was only 0.27 for every 1000 people, this rate has risen to 
55 per 1000 in 2011 (Feng and Li, 2013). Rising affluence combined with growing 
automobile ownership suggests that the scope for status competition through vehicles 
and the effects that we observe may intensify in the future. The extent to which our 
findings apply more broadly depends on the extent to which this group is selected and 
to which motivations for consumption signaling could vary across other commodities, 
over time, or by income level. 
Our paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the construction of our 
dataset and presents summary statistics on the sample investigated. Section III 
undertakes the differences in differences analysis and discusses the implications of 
marriage market competition for consumption behavior in this setting. Section IV 
explores the potential for heterogeneity in the estimated relationship and examines 
several potential implications of consumption signaling behavior specific to the 
automobile industry. Section V concludes. 
 
2.2. Data 
  The data is constructed from three principal sources. Information on automobile 
transactions and car purchasers themselves is provided by a large Chinese financial 
institution from 2009 through 2011. The source provides records on 24,134 individual 
loans, and includes borrowers from all provinces of mainland China except Tibet. A key 
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advantage of this data is the level of detail contained on the vehicles purchased and on 
individual borrowers including information on marital status, age, gender, education, 
and earnings as well as on the geographic location of purchase. We also derive 
information on prefecture-level outcomes, which are obtained from both provincial 
statistical yearbooks or from the National Bureau of Statistics (CEInet, 2015). 
Panel A of Table 2.1 presents summary statistics on car buyer characteristics. One 
noticeable feature is that borrowers are comparatively rich, with average annual 
earnings of nearly 100,000 RMB, which is over $16,000. In contrast, average income 
per capita is roughly 35,100 RMB according to the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, which highlights that the sample of car purchasers is highly selected.
9
 Most 
purchasers are male, middle-aged, married and have received at least a college 
education. Panel B provides detail on the cars purchased in the sample.
10
 As can be seen 
from the table, over half of the cars are foreign brands and approximately one-fourth are 
luxury vehicles. The average miles-per-gallon (MPG) is city/highway combined and is 
slightly below 30.  
Panel C reports prefecture-level characteristics. The dataset contains transactions 
occurring in some 292 of the 334 total prefectures in China, while we have prefecture-
level economic statistics for roughly 254 regions. Across regions with data, average 
income is 45,324 RMB. The mean GDP per capita across prefectures in our sample is 
higher than China’s GDP per capita in 2011 (35,100 RMB), a difference which reflects 
                                                 
       
9
Comparable estimates from the 2011 Chinese Household Finance Survey suggest that new car 
purchasers earn on average 65,000 RMB, which is closer to that found in our sample. The true difference 
may be even smaller as our data is not survey data, and it is well known that survey estimates of income, 
particularly in developing countries often understate mean income (Deaton, 2005). 
       
10
Expenditures have been deflated to real prices using a base month of September 2010 and the 
official consumer price index. 
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the fact that more automobile purchases are undertaken by inhabitants of wealthier 
regions and that this value is not population weighted.
 11
 The overall sex ratio, obtained 
from Provincial Statistical Year books, based primarily on Hukou derived estimates, is 
roughly 1.05 males per female across all prefectures, although this value is more 
skewed for younger cohorts. We explore the robustness of our analysis to alternative 
measures of the sex ratio, such as those based on Census data, in Section 3. Furthermore, 
this value masks substantial geographic heterogeneity; Figure 2.1 depicts the sex ratio 
by prefecture (measured as the ratio of males per 100 females). Although some of the 
most severely imbalanced gender ratios exist in rural areas, the issue is not limited to 
such areas. Overall, the sex ratio ranges from a low of 90 to a high of over 132 men per 
100 women. 
 
2.3. Analysis 
 Estimating the relationship between the level of competition in the marriage 
market (here measured by the sex ratio) and positional spending (captured by the 
purchases of more luxurious automobiles) is complicated by a number of factors. For 
example, a primary concern is that the presence of a more skewed sex ratio may be 
correlated with other omitted factors such as variation in terms of average incomes, 
education levels, or even male/female gender roles in a region.  
We attempt to mitigate this and related sources of endogeneity through the use of a 
triple differences approach. Specifically, we compare male and female car purchasers, 
                                                 
       
11
The financial institution may also be more likely to make loans to individuals in richer prefectures. 
In order to maintain a representative sample of Chinese consumers, we exclude those with annual 
incomes in excess of 250,000 RMB. 
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who are and are not married, across low and high sex ratio regions.  Our identification 
of the effects of high sex ratio on Chinese men’s car-purchasing preference thus relies 
on the interaction between gender and marital status. In Chinese culture, the family of a 
groom is traditionally responsible for purchasing a house at the time of marriage, 
suggesting that males may also have a stronger incentive than females at this stage of 
their life to signal wealth through a range of visible expenditures (Wei et al., 2012). 
This pressure has intensified with increasing competition for brides and the incentive 
should act on the unmarried rather than on married men (Wei and Zhang, 2011).  
For illustrative purposes, we begin our analysis with an example triple difference 
mean estimate presented in Table 2.2. For simplicity we calculate means using the top 
quartile and bottom quartiles of sex ratio.
12
 In the more imbalanced areas, unmarried 
men, on average, purchase cars that are 7025 RMB (column (5)) more expensive than 
those unmarried women purchase. By contrast, for married individuals, men’s 
automobiles are only 811 RMB (column (6)) more expensive than married women’s 
purchases. The difference in difference is 6214 RMB as is shown in the top of column 
(7).  
Next we carry out the same analysis for the quartile of less skewed sex ratio 
provinces. We find that the mean difference-in-difference here is small but actually 
negative (-996 RMB as shown in the middle of column 7), implying that there is no 
obvious car-related conspicuous consumption in this group.  Finally, our triple 
difference estimate is simply the difference between these two double differences: 7210 
RMB, (or around $1200) which is an economically important effect. 
                                                 
       
12
The mean sex ratios in these two groups are 100.6 and 110.5 respectively. 
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In what follows, we run regressions that implement a regression version of this 
basic triple-difference approach. Equation (1) presents this triple difference estimation 
strategy, with all component interactions included: 
 
εθXsexratio*unmarried*maleβ
unmarried*sexratioβsexratio*maleβunmarried*maleβ
sexratioβunmarriedβmaleβαCarprice
7
654
321



Z
 
 
where X is a vector of borrower characteristics and Z is a vector of prefecture and 
province level controls. In theory, the coefficient on the triple interaction, β7, should 
isolate the specific portion of consumption expenditure undertaken by the group with 
the highest motivation to signal status, unmarried males facing high levels of 
competition. In some specifications, we also include a set of province fixed effects, 
denoted by η. 
The results of estimating equation (1) are presented in Table 2.3 with each column 
(1)-(5) adding additional controls. Column (1) estimates the triple difference with no 
controls. Column (2) includes controls for borrower characteristics including age, age 
squared, earnings and educational attainment, while column (3) additionally includes 
the prefecture characteristics listed in Table 2.1. Finally, column (4) includes province 
fixed effects, while column (5) incorporates a control for housing prices (for regions of 
the China with available data) because houses have also been specifically shown to be a 
positional good in the Chinese case (Wei and Zhang, 2012). We include controls for 
local housing prices only in some specifications because they dramatically limit the 
sample.  
(1) 
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In all specifications, the coefficient estimate of interest on the triple interaction 
term is positive and statistically significant at the .10 level or better. The estimated 
impacts are economically meaningful as well. To put the magnitude of the coefficients 
in perspective, the estimated coefficient on the triple interaction in Column (5) implies 
that if one were to go from a prefecture in which there is parity in the sex ratio to a 
prefecture with a sex ratio that is 1 standard deviation above the mean in favor of males, 
then the typical car purchased by an unmarried male would be 4,285 RMB more 
expensive. This change represents a 3.3% increase in the mean purchase price paid by 
this group of consumers. 
An additional concern is that several large Chinese cities such as Beijing, 
Guangzhou, and Shanghai have also enacted vehicle ownership restrictions such as 
auctions and lotteries in an effort to curb congestion and pollution (Feng and Li, 2013). 
Restrictions may alter the pool of individuals eligible to purchase cars and may limit the 
scope for status competition through consumption signaling in these regions. As a check, 
Table 2.4 demonstrates that the results we obtain are robust to the exclusion of these 
areas. 
Higher purchase prices could reflect numerous car characteristics, not all of which 
may equally convey status. An advantage of studying automobiles is that vehicles are 
already classified as standard or as luxury models both across and within producers. As 
an alternative approach, we consider the likelihood an individual purchases a car which 
is classified as luxury. To do this we estimate an equation as in (1), using a probit 
specification, with an outcome variable which is an indicator taking the value of one for 
luxury automobiles. The results of this exercise are presented in Column (6) of Table 
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2.3 and are reported as the marginal effect. Using the same comparison as in Column 
(5), the estimates suggest that unmarried male consumers in prefectures one standard 
deviation above the mean would be 4.8 percentage points more likely to purchase a 
luxury car than those in a balanced prefecture. 
While the OLS results are instructive, the use of income as a regressor in the model 
makes it possible that we may have issues with heteroskedasticity.
13
 In fact both a 
general test (the White test) and a specific test focusing on income (the Goldfeld-
Quandt test) decisively reject the null of homoscedasticity at the 0.01 level (results not 
shown). As a result, we re-estimate our model in Table 2.5 using Feasible Generalized 
Least Squares (FGLS) where the error variance is proportional to income raised to an 
unknown exponent that we estimate in a first stage regression using the OLS residuals. 
As can be seen, our coefficient of interest, the interaction of unmarried, male, and the 
sex ratio is fairly constant in size across the two approaches, but estimated much more 
precisely using FGLS. The estimates now exhibit significance at the .05 level or better 
in all five specifications. We thus use the FGLS model approach for the subsequent 
analyses in Section IV. 
As a final robustness check, we examine the sensitivity of our estimation results to 
alternative measures of the sex ratio. While our primary measure has the distinct 
advantage of having consistent data for a very large number of prefectures, alternative 
measures exist which can be used to disaggregate sex ratios by age group instead of 
those for the entire local populace. For instance, it is possible to calculate age-specific 
sex-ratios for many prefectures using China’s National Census from 2010. This can also 
                                                 
       
13
Heteroskedasticity related to scale is a classic case in the literature, and if the scale variable is also 
included as a regressor in the model, the efficiency gains from using GLS can be substantial. See Baum 
(2006, pp. 144-147). 
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be done at an aggregated level across all provinces. Because marriage market pressures 
should only be exerted by the presence of those of marriageable age, it is worthwhile to 
examine the local sex ratio of these groups specifically.  
We reproduce our results using these alternative measures of local sex-ratios in 
Table 2.6. Columns (1) and (4) reproduce our original OLS and FGLS results for 
comparison. We present results for the age range 20-49 because most initial marriages 
fall within this range. We elect for this range because the legal age of marriage for 
women in China is 20.
14
 Results using data we extracted from the 2010 Chinese 
National Census are presented for the OLS and FGLS regressions in (2) and (5).
 15,16
 In 
both cases, the magnitude of the effect is slightly smaller, but the sign and significance 
of the estimated impacts remain consistent. We also reproduce the analysis using the 
overall provincial age-specific sex ratios obtained from statistical year book data. These 
are presented in columns (3) and (6). This alternative approach yields slightly larger 
estimated impacts, but is again consistent with the original results.  
 
2.4. Extensions 
                                                 
       
14
Reassuringly, the results are also not overly sensitive to this choice. In addition to those presented 
in the table, we additionally examined multiple windows of age specific sex ratios, ranging from more 
narrow (20-39) to broader (15-64), and this exercise generally produces results consistent with those in 
the text -- although the magnitude and significance of the estimate coefficient varies slightly from 
specification to specification. 
       
15
This is perhaps not surprising as correlations between our population level measure and age-
specific sex ratios are quite high (0.84 for the 20-49 year old sample for example). 
       
16
This data source is not available for as many prefectures as could be obtained from the provincial 
statistical yearbooks, particularly for less populated areas, so we apply the disaggregated age-specific sex 
ratios of the overarching province when this is unavailable. 
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2.4.1. Heterogeneous Effects 
Results presented in Tables 2.3 through 2.5 suggest a highly significant 
conspicuous consumption effect, where every one point increase in the sex ratio raises 
car spending by roughly 450 RMB for unmarried males relative to all other types of 
individuals. In this subsection we consider two possible types of heterogeneity in this 
relationship. The first is heterogeneity across income levels. This is especially important 
in the context of conspicuous consumption where the positional goods used for 
signaling may vary for different reference groups and income levels (Chai and Kaus, 
2012). For example, in our context, it is quite possible that, at very high levels of 
income, unmarried males use ownership of houses or land to signal their worthiness to 
potential partners (as demonstrated by Wei and Zhang, 2011) while those with lower 
income levels compete by signaling with relatively lower cost commodities such as 
automobiles.  
To investigate, we split our data in quartiles of income and estimate a separate 
triple difference FGLS regression within each subgroup. These results are reported in 
Table 2.7 and strongly suggest that the use of cars as a signaling mechanism is 
concentrated primarily in the lower income quartile in our sample.  Specifically, we 
document a highly significant average effect which is roughly 50% to 100% larger than 
our average effect estimated for the full sample. Estimates for the second income 
quartile are small, negative and not significantly different from zero. Those for the third 
and fourth income quartiles also show effects larger than our full sample estimates, but 
they are generally not precisely estimated, only occasionally reaching significance at the 
0.10 level. 
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A second possibility we investigate is that pressure for consumption signaling may 
vary in a non-linear manner across regions as a function of the relative shortage of 
women. For example, it may be that a one unit change in the sex ratio in highly skewed 
regions may not have the same effect on the consumption pattern of unmarried males in 
only weakly skewed regions. It could be the case that at relatively balanced sex ratios, 
the incentive to compete by conspicuous consumption may be attenuated relative to the 
incentive at higher ratios.  
We investigate this case in Table 2.8 which parcels the sample in quartiles of the 
sex ratio distribution.  It is apparent that robust and precise estimates only appear for the 
most skewed sex ratio regions. In these regions sex ratios are highly skewed, ranging 
from 107 to 132 males per female, so it is unsurprising that this would be the subset of 
prefectures where pressure for consumption signaling is greatest. 
Our sample is not large enough to split the data by both sex ratio and income 
quartiles at once and still precisely estimate the model. At the same time, the results 
above provide suggestive evidence that it is the relatively poorest males in the regions 
with the most imbalanced sex ratios that heavily use car purchases as conspicuous 
consumption to signal to potential marriage partners.  
 
2.4.2. Externalities Associated with Conspicuous Consumption 
 A number of studies have established negative impacts of consumption signaling. 
This includes diversion of expenditures away from commodities thought to have 
positive externalities such as education, with particularly detrimental consequences for 
lower income households (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007; Brown et al., 2011; Charles et al., 
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2009; Moav and Neeman, 2010, 2012; Case et al., 2013; Kaus, 2013). Other authors 
have argued that collective action may make conspicuous consumption an unproductive 
necessity. In other words, to the extent that everyone within a reference group 
undertakes some expenditure specifically to signal status, the ultimate result can be that 
individuals engage in a rat race with no net change in local distribution of status 
(Hopkins & Kornienko, 2004).
17
 We explore a further potential impact of this behavior 
– that the expenditure changes may directly generate negative externalities.  
Automobiles are a commonly studied commodity thought to generate negative 
externalities due to their impact on air pollution, congestion, and use of natural 
resources. Some of these can be quantified and measured in a standardized form. For 
our sample, we compile data on average mileage (in MPG) and weight (in lbs) of all 
vehicles in our data. MPG should be informative of the impact cars have on both 
resource use and on pollution, as well as the vehicle’s lifetime usage cost. Weight can 
generate negative externalities, both through its impact on average MPG and through its 
impact on the severity of car crashes (Anderson and Auffhammer, 2014). 
To get a sense for how large the impact of these externalities could be, we focus on 
prefectures in the highest quartile of skewed sex ratio and estimate the FGLS regression 
as in Table 2.8.
18
 As can be seen from the Table 2.9, cars purchased by unmarried males 
in the most skewed regions exhibit both lower fuel economy and higher weight. The 
MPG effect is rather sizeable, with a one unit increase in the sex ratio among the most 
                                                 
       
17
In such a world, there exists a pareto-improvement in which one could reallocate everyone’s 
expenditure away from positional commodities in favor of others which may be desirable on other 
grounds, but doing so unilaterally is not individually rational, as failing to signal alone would net a 
relative fall in status.  
       
18
Estimates obtained from regressions utilizing the full sample are roughly one fourth to one half of 
those for this group in magnitude and are generally less precisely estimated. 
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skewed sex ratio regions being associated with a reduction in fuel efficiency in the 
range of 0.30 to 0.47 MPG. This suggests that consumption signaling in this setting may 
indeed be exacerbating this class of existing negative externalities associated with 
automobiles. Interestingly, the impact of vehicle weight is not economically meaningful 
in size with these vehicles being only a few pounds heavier per unit change in the sex 
ratio.
19
 As can be seen in Panel B of Table 2.1, the standard deviation of weight is pretty 
low as well, suggesting that cars purchased in China are relatively homogenous in size. 
 
2.5. Conclusion  
Using a novel dataset on borrowers in China, we have shown that the increasingly 
skewed sex ratios in many parts of the country are creating incentives for unmarried 
men to significantly alter their automobile consumption habits in ways that appear 
competitive in nature. The effects that we observe are strongest in the quartile of 
regions with the most unbalanced sex ratios, suggesting that positional spending may 
yet worsen if the sex ratio continues to deteriorate.  
We further demonstrate that the largest expenditure reallocations occur among the 
poorest quartile of borrowers in our sample. This evidence supports the hypothesis that 
the range of commodities used to jockey for social status varies across individuals in 
different portions of the income distribution (or among those facing different peer 
groups). Beyond the direct social inefficiency that status competition represents, we 
demonstrate that this behavior also leads to consumption of vehicles with lower vehicle 
fuel efficiency. Thus, to the extent that China’s one child policy has generated 
                                                 
       
19
This suggests that it is possible to signal status through vehicle quality without requiring larger cars 
to do so. 
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incentives which further skewed sex ratios, it may also have exacerbated social status 
competition. In many areas of the country, unmarried men now appear to compete in a 
zero-sum game of consumption signaling, one which is capable of generating large 
negative externalities. Given that there is little reason to suspect that growth in the rate 
of car ownership in China will slow, conspicuous consumption may become even more 
important and generate greater aggregate distortions as time passes. 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
    Panel A: Borrower Characteristics Obs Mean  Std. Dev. 
Age 24,133 35.62 7.91 
Male 24,133 0.75 0.43 
Earnings 24,133 98,027 51,608 
Married 24,133 0.84 0.37 
Educational Attainment 
   
Illiterate 24,133 0.00 0.02 
Elementary 24,133 0.10 0.30 
High School 24,133 0.30 0.46 
College 24,133 0.59 0.49 
Graduate 24,133 0.01 0.11 
    Panel B: Car Characteristics    
Purchase Price 24,133 131,071 46,724 
Foreign 24,133 0.56 0.50 
Luxury Make 24,133 0.24 0.43 
Fuel Efficiency (Combined mpg) 24,133 29.35 3.31 
Vehicle Weight (lbs) 24,133 1,360 154 
 
   
Panel C: Prefecture Characteristics    
Sex Ratio (Male/Female*100) 292 105.28 4.22 
Income (GDP per capita) 254 45,324 29,611 
Population (10,000) 254 135.40 152.47 
Mean House Price in Jan 2010 (per square meters) 97 7,037 4,556 
Paved Road Area (per capita) 253 10.87 7.29 
Buses (Per 10,000 people) 254 7.72 7.75 
Taxis (Per 10,000 people) 254 22.26 18.20 
        
      Notes: Pooled sample spanning 2009-2011. Expenditures are deflated to real 2010 RMB prices 
using the CPI. Sample excludes individuals earning in excess of 250,000 RMB per year. 
Source: Panel A and B: Authors' calculations using vehicle loan data detailed in Section 4; MPG 
information obtained from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of China (2014). 
Panel C: Most variables are obtained from China Economic Information Network (CEInet) 
Statistics Database. Sex ratios are derived from the provincial statistical yearbooks (2011) and 
mean house prices are obtained from www.elivecity.cn. 
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Table 2.2: Mean Differences in Differences of Car Price by Gender, Marital 
Status, and Sex Ratio  
 
Men Women Difference 
Difference 
in  
Unmarried Married Unmarried Married Unmarried Married Difference 
Sex 
Ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(5)=(1)-
(3) 
(6)=(2)-
(4) 
(7)=(5)-
(6) 
Top 
Quartile  
131,084 142,438 124,059 141,627 7,025 811 6,214 
 
(47570) (50763) (41981) (53044) 
   
Bottom 
Quartile  
119,417 130,114 115,302 125,003 4,115 5,111 -996 
 
(38078) (44786) (35841) (43586) 
   
Diff-in-
Diff-in-
Diff 
            7,210 
      Notes: Sources and sample as described in Table 1. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
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        Note: Sources and sample as described in Table 1. Borrower characteristics include age, age squared, 
earnings, and dummies for education level. Prefecture characteristics include income per capita, 
population, paved road area, buses, and taxis per capita. Standard errors are clustered at the province 
level in specifications (1)-(3) and reported in parenthesis, while columns (4) and (5) report Huber-White 
robust standard errors in parenthesis. Column (6) reports marginal effects from a probit regression with a 
dependent variable of an indicator for luxury car status.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 
 
Table 2.3: The Impact of the Sex Ratio on the Automobile Purchase Price of 
Unmarried Males in China 
Dependent Variable: Automobile Sales Price 
Probit: 
Luxury 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Male 36,586** 22,608 23,510 24,749* 29,546** 0.291*** 
 
(16,194) (16,433) (16,586) (13,530) (14,436) (0.088) 
Unmarried 34,481** 38,869*** 37,044*** 36,511* 36,289* 0.406** 
 
(15,212) (14,662) (14,334) (20,165) (20,253) (0.206) 
Sex Ratio 1,031*** 849*** 881*** 600*** 369** 0.004** 
 
(137) (147) (196) (126) (149) (0.001) 
Unmarried 
*Sexratio 
-432*** -497*** -479*** -473** -469** -0.004*** 
 
(144) (134) (132) (193) (194) (0.001) 
Unmarried*Male -42,378** -42,168** -36,111* -37,093 -40,759 -0.247*** 
 
(17,829) (19,622) (19,243) (26,863) (27,978) (0.051) 
Sexratio*Male -322** -285* -294* -304** -341** -0.004*** 
 
(147) (148) (150) (129) (139) (0.001) 
Sexratio*Male 
*Unmarried 
401** 505*** 443** 451* 480* 0.005*** 
 
(172) (183) (180) (258) (269) (0.002) 
Mean Prefecture 
House price     
-0.33* 0.000 
     
(0.17) (0.000) 
Borrower 
Characteristics 
N Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Prefecture 
Characteristics 
N N Y Y Y Y 
 
Province Fixed 
Effects 
N N N Y Y Y 
 
Mean of Car 
Price 
 
130,771 130,771 130,806 130,806 128,869 0.239 
Number of Obs 24,133 24,133 23,520 23,520 14,929 14,929 
R2 0.017 0.143 0.144 0.150 0.156 0.105 
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       Notes: FGLS estimates. Sources, sample, and controls as described in Table 4. Standard errors are 
clustered at the province level in specifications (1)-(3) and reported in parenthesis, while columns (4) 
and (5) report Huber-White robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 2.4: Excluding Cities with Ownership Restrictions 
Dependent Variable: Automobile Sales Price 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Male 36,863.57** 19,449.57 19,755.79 21,077.00 26,956.20** 
 
(15,905.76) (15,815.61) (15,904.49) (15,675.42) (12,839.15) 
Unmarried 35,602.73** 37,400.47** 34,887.62** 33,604.08** 34,271.76** 
 
(14,375.00) (15,525.67) (14,767.52) (14,115.36) (14,243.03) 
Sex Ratio 1,021.11*** 795.33*** 822.79*** 579.98** 319.05* 
 
(139.86) (154.33) (199.81) (242.01) (171.96) 
Unmarried 
*Sexratio 
-440.57*** -479.42*** -454.68*** -442.06*** -445.03*** 
 
(136.90) (143.60) (137.31) (131.49) (131.59) 
Unmarried 
*Male 
-41,921.58** -40,664.60** -37,062.16* -36,903.49* -37,800.37** 
 
(17,755.54) (19,185.87) (20,038.23) (19,975.29) (17,537.81) 
Sexratio*Male -325.75** -256.32* -259.14* -270.43* -316.61*** 
 
(144.68) (143.84) (144.78) (142.46) (113.28) 
Sexratio*Male*
Unmarried 
398.55** 489.82** 452.68** 449.11** 450.79*** 
 
(171.29) (179.28) (188.39) (188.93) (157.97) 
    
  Borrower 
Characteristics 
N Y Y Y Y 
 
Prefecture 
Characteristics 
N N Y Y Y 
 
Province Fixed 
Effects 
N N N Y Y 
 
Housing Price 
Controls 
N N N N Y 
 
Mean of Car 
Price 
 
130,946 130,946 130,987 130,987 129,052 
Number of Obs 23,339 23,339 22,726 22,726 14,135 
R2 0.017 0.135 0.137 0.143 0.149 
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Table 2.5: FGLS Estimates (Variance as a Function of Earnings) 
Dependent Variable: Automobile Sales Price 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Male 34,107.68** 17,855.65 17,966.41 19,163.70 23,896.85* 
 
(15,620.13) (14,978.61) (14,971.25) (14,766.65) (11,976.82) 
Unmarried 32,572.44** 34,448.65** 31,942.09** 31,007.41** 30,952.79** 
 
(15,168.15) (14,660.48) (13,927.77) (13,433.41) (13,353.83) 
Sex Ratio 997.76*** 786.94*** 811.81*** 564.03** 295.41* 
 
(134.73) (146.99) (186.80) (238.57) (171.11) 
Unmarried 
*Sexratio 
-413.07*** -453.02*** -428.42*** -418.67*** -415.72*** 
 
(144.78) (135.53) (129.54) (125.18) (123.11) 
Unmarried*Male -42,692.22** -41,587.42** -37,304.11* -36,907.21* -37,159.15** 
 
(17,202.17) (18,340.38) (18,947.05) (18,983.67) (16,071.10) 
Sexratio*Male -301.05** -241.49* -242.67* -252.89* -289.10** 
 
(142.83) (136.35) (136.29) (134.19) (105.18) 
Sexratio*Male 
*Unmarried 
405.43** 497.73*** 454.43** 448.63** 444.43*** 
 
(166.50) (171.84) (178.63) (180.23) (145.43) 
Mean  Prefecture 
Houseprice     
-0.29 
     
(0.19) 
     
 Borrower 
Characteristics 
N Y Y Y Y 
 
Prefecture 
Characteristics 
N N Y Y Y 
 
Province Fixed  
Effects 
N N N Y Y 
 
 
    
Mean of Car  
Price 
130,771 130,771 130,806 130,806 128,869 
 
Number of Obs 
24,133 24,133 23,520 23,520 14,929 
R2 0.017 0.143 0.144 0.150 0.156 
       Notes: Sources, sample, and controls as described in Table 3. Standard errors are clustered at the 
province level in specifications (1)-(3) and reported in parenthesis, while columns (4) and (5) report 
Huber-White robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.6: Robustness Checks Using Age Adjusted Sex Ratios 
Dependent Variable: Automobile Sales Price 
 
OLS  FGLS 
 
(1) 
Prefecture 
(2) 
Prefecture 
(3) 
Province   
(4) 
Prefecture 
(5) 
Prefecture 
(6)  
Province 
  
Overall sex 
ratio 
20-49 years 
old 
20-49 
years old 
  
Overall 
sex ratio 
20-49 
years old 
20-49  
years old 
Male 23,510 12205 47436** 
 
17,966 5603 46833* 
 
(16,586) (9258) (21707) 
 
(14,971) (12751) (27504) 
Unmarried 37,044*** 21952* 50196* 
 
31,942** 13150 38524 
 
(14,334) (12892) (25494) 
 
(13,927) (15338) (25921) 
Sex Ratio 881*** 554*** 636** 
 
811*** 431** 623* 
 
(196) (150) (284) 
 
(186) (159) (333) 
Unmarried 
*Sexratio 
-479*** -371*** -650*** 
 
-428*** -276* -526** 
 
(132) (118) (243) 
 
(129) (137) (243) 
Unmarried*Male -36,111* -20412 -46037 
 
-37,304* -18003 -43900 
 
(19,243) (14790) (30926) 
 
(18,947) (16791) (27191) 
Sexratio*Male -294* -210** -557*** 
 
-242* -149 -552** 
 
(150) (84) (208) 
 
(136) (116) (266) 
Sexratio*Male 
*Unmarried 
443** 322** 576* 
 
454** 294* 550** 
 
(180) (137) (299) 
 
(178) (155) (262) 
Borrower  
Characteristics 
Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
 
Prefecture  
Characteristics 
Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
 
Province Fixed  
Effects 
N N N 
 
N N N 
 
Housing Price  
Controls 
N N N 
 
N N N 
 
 
      
Mean of Car 
Price 
130,771 130,771 130,771 
 
130,771 130,771 130,771 
Number of Obs 23,520 23,520 23,520 
 
23,520 23,520 23,520 
R2 0.131 0.132 0.107   0.108 0.089 0.089 
         Notes: Sources and sample as described in Table 2. Borrower characteristics include age, age 
squared, earnings, and dummies for education levels. Prefecture characteristics include income per 
capita, population, paved road area, buses, and taxis per capita. Standard errors are clustered at the 
province level and reported in parenthesis. Column (1) and (4) are copied from column (3) of Table 3 
and Table 4 for comparison. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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        Notes: Sources, sample, and controls as described in Table 4. FGLS estimates of the triple 
interaction coefficient from Table 4. Overall sample is 24,133 split into quartiles. Standard errors are 
clustered at the province level in specifications (1)-(3) and reported in parenthesis, while columns (4) 
and (5) report Huber-White robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 
 
Table 2.7: Exploring Earnings Heterogeneity 
Dependent Variable: Automobile Sales Price 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1st Quartile (0, 60,000) 1,033*** 920*** 794*** 769*** 717** 
 
(251) (255) (241) (260) (277) 
2nd Quartile (60,000, 90,000) -283 -239 -149 -94 -71 
 
(322) (326) (268) (266) (204) 
3rd Quartile (90,000, 12,000) 710 754* 658 739* 487 
 
(466) (404) (425) (426) (288) 
4th Quartile (12,000, 25,000) 499 550 511 479 954* 
 
(609) (513) (512) (515) (538) 
    
  Borrower Characteristics N Y Y Y Y 
Prefecture Characteristics N N Y Y Y 
Province Fixed Effects N N N Y Y 
Housing Price Controls N N N N Y 
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Table 2.8: Exploring Regional Sex Ratio Heterogeneity 
Dependent Variable: Automobile Sales Price 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1st Quartile (89.67, 102.74) -368 305 330 377 651 
 
(542) (440) (418) (364) (490) 
2nd Quartile (102.74, 105.14) 2,098 5,442 6,481* 6,654* 5,015 
 
(3,640) (3,526) (3,487) (3,465) (2,990) 
3rd Quartile (105.14, 107.75) 282 -2,536 -1,491 -1,016 -4,405 
 
(4,661) (2,556) (2,504) (2,852) (2,950) 
4th Quartile (107.75, 132.40) 724*** 403** 374** 353** 280 
 
(189) (150) (161) (147) (210) 
    
  Borrower Characteristics N Y Y Y Y 
Prefecture Characteristics N N Y Y Y 
Province Fixed Effects N N N Y Y 
Housing Price Controls N N N N Y 
         Notes: Sources, sample, and controls as described in Table 4. FGLS estimates of the triple 
interaction coefficient from Table 4. Overall sample is 24,133 split into quartiles. Standard errors are 
clustered at the province level in specifications (1)-(3) and reported in parenthesis, while columns (4) 
and (5) report Huber-White robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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         Notes: Sources, sample, and controls as described in Table 4. FGLS estimates of the triple 
interaction coefficient from Table 6 for the fourth quartile of sex ratio. Samples range from 5,973 to 
5,703 observations except for column (6) which has 2,337 observations. Standard errors are clustered at 
the province level in specifications (1)-(3) and reported in parenthesis, while columns (4) and (5) report 
Huber-White robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Table 2.9: Externalities Associated with Luxury Purchases 
Dependent Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
Fuel Efficiency -0.047*** -0.038*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.032** 
 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) 
Vehicle Weight 2.44*** 1.67** 1.54** 1.55** 1.76*** 
 
(0.67) (0.60) (0.60) (0.61) (0.54) 
   
   Borrower Characteristics N Y Y Y Y 
Prefecture Characteristics N N Y Y Y 
Province Fixed Effects N N N Y Y 
Housing Price Controls N N N N Y 
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Figure 2.1: Sex Ratios by Prefecture 
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Chapter 3: Equity Market Liberalization and Economic Growth 
Revisited: New Data and New Methods 
3.1. Introduction 
Equity market liberalization, also known as stock market liberalization, enables 
foreign investors to trade in a country’s domestic equity securities market, and is a form 
of financial liberalization.
20
 Growth theory does not provide a clear prediction 
concerning how liberalization should impact economic growth. On the one hand, there 
are many channels through which equity market liberalization may contribute to growth. 
The most direct channel is that liberalization attracts foreign funding for domestic 
companies. In addition, liberalization could also facilitate financial development 
(Fuchs-Schundeln et al., 2003), reduce capital cost (Henry, 2000a; Bekaert and Harvey, 
2000), improve risk-sharing (Iwata and Wu, 2009), boost private investment (Henry, 
2000b), enhance export (Manova, 2008), improve corporate control (Levine, 2002), and 
ameliorate firm-level operating performance (Mitton, 2006). There are other benefits 
associated with liberalization such as higher equity prices (Henry, 2000a), higher 
turnover ratio and better compatibility of incentives of shareholders and managers 
(Fuchs-Schundeln et al., 2003). On the other hand, liberalization could generate extra 
risk, induce macroeconomic volatility, or increase the frequency of crises. Moreover, in 
the presence of information asymmetries, foreign capital may be invested inefficiently, 
                                                 
      
1
Broadly speaking, financial liberalization consists of equity market liberalization, capital account 
liberalization and banking sector liberalization. 
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leading to a slower output growth (Stiglitz, 2000). Therefore, the net impact of 
liberalization on growth is ambiguous in theory and merits empirical evaluation.  
Previous empirical research has failed to arrive at a consensus, finding somewhat 
mixed results.
21
 For instance, Bekaert et al. (2005) document a 1 percent increase in 
annual real growth rate associated with liberalization and show that the first five years 
after liberalization account for most of the impact. Fuchs-Schundeln et al. (2003) find a 
4 percent cumulative short-term growth effect within 4 years after liberalization as well 
as a 0.4 percent per year permanent growth effect. Bonfiglioli et al. (2004) compare the 
impact of equity market liberalization with that of capital account openness and show 
that the former affects growth directly while the latter impacts growth by altering the 
financial depth. In contrast, Ben Naceur et al. (2008) inspect cases in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) but fail to find any significant relationship between 
liberalization and growth. Similarly, Ben Gamra (2009) studies East Asian countries 
and reports a weak negative effect.  
In this paper, we start out by replicating the key results in Bekaert et al. (2005), a 
highly influential and comprehensive study in this topic. Then we contribute to the 
literature by carrying out two extensions. Probably the most important extension is the 
expansion of the database. While previous studies provide great insight into the growth 
effect of liberalization, to the best of our knowledge, all of them utilize data on stock 
market liberalization prior to 2000. We close this gap by enlarging the data through 
2011, which leads to the inclusion of 25 additional liberalization cases that are not 
                                                 
      
21
A large body of existing research has attempted to empirically evaluate the relationship between 
overall financial market liberalization and economic growth, but finds mixed evidence. Detailed surveys 
can be found in Hermes and Lensink (2005) and Kose et al. (2009), and a meta-analysis in Bumann et al. 
(2013). Most of these studies are narrowly focused on the impact of capital account liberalization, leaving 
only a small portion of them examining the growth effect of equity market liberalization. 
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considered in previous research. Among these liberalizations, some emerged after 1999, 
others are “old” cases that occurred before 2000 but have not been identified or have 
been neglected by the existing literature. We decide to include all countries that opened 
up their stock markets between 1980 and 2011 for the analysis. We also perform 
robustness checks by excluding countries with special circumstances surrounding 
liberalization. 
Our second extension is the use of propensity score matching (PSM) to address 
endogenous policy selection. Most papers that study the effects of liberalization have 
employed panel data estimations via OLS, seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), fixed 
effects, or GMM. A common limitation of these studies is that they rely on the 
assumption that liberalizations are exogenous, ignoring the possibility of endogenous 
policy selection.
22
 This drawback could bias the estimates of the treatment effect if, on 
average, countries that adopted liberalization policies are fundamentally different from 
countries that did not, in terms of the determinants of economic growth. Thus, it is of 
great importance to construct a valid counterfactual in order to derive an unbiased 
causal impact of liberalization.  
To accomplish this, we employ propensity score matching methods introduced by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1985). We further combine matching with a hazard 
model to take account of the temporal variation in our data. As a first step, a Cox 
proportional hazard model is applied to estimate the probabilities (propensity scores) of 
liberalization for each country-year. The scores are then used to find a valid comparison 
group in the matching process. Finally, we use difference-in-difference to find the one-
                                                 
       
22
Bakeart et al. (2005) attempt to address the endogeneity by controlling for exogenous growth 
opportunities a country faces. 
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year average through ten-year average growth effects associated with equity market 
liberalization. We find that correcting for the selection bias leads to more persistent 
growth effects than previous research has documented. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the data. 
Section 3 replicates Bekaert et al. (2005) and applies their methods on our expanded 
dataset. Section 4 conducts the survival analysis and propensity score matching. Section 
5 summarizes the paper. 
 
3.2. Data 
Our sample covers 166 countries/regions that had not opened their stock markets as 
of 1980. Among them, 65 economies liberalized during the period 1980-2011. This 
treatment group is composed of 10 countries from Latin America and the Caribbean, 10 
from Sub-Saharan Africa, 11 from the Middle East and North Africa, 14 from Asia and 
Oceania, and 20 from Europe. The most important variable in this study is the date of 
equity market liberalization. Three competing methods have been employed in the 
literature to identify the liberalization dates. Official decree date, which is the date of 
the official announcement of liberalization, is a natural choice and is probably the most 
frequently used method. The second type of the liberalization date is the earliest date of 
the following three events: official decree announcement, first American Depositary 
Receipt (ADR) announcement, and first country fund launch.
23
 Finally, if researchers 
are interested in differentiating levels of liberalization, they can use liberalization 
                                                 
       
23
ADR is a security representing shares in a foreign stock that is traded in U.S. financial markets and 
is denominated in U.S. dollars. A country fund is usually launched by investment companies, and makes 
investments in equity shares from a particular foreign country. 
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intensity indices, such as the share of domestic equity securities that foreign investors 
can purchase.  
We adopt the official decree date as our liberalization date. The data for the period 
1980-1997 mainly come from Bekaert et al. (2005) and Fuchs-Schundeln et al. 
(2003).
24
 We enlarge the database by including cases between 1998 and 2011, primarily 
based on Standard & Poor’s Global Stock Market Factbook, annual Investment Climate 
Statements from U.S. Department of State, A Chronology of Important Financial, 
Economic and Political Events in Emerging Markets compiled by Bekaert and Harvey, 
and a few other papers and books. We also incorporate liberalizing countries between 
1980 and 1997 that have failed to be recognized by existing literature.
25
  
The liberalization dates used in this study are presented in Table 3.1. We further 
provide the reasons for our date choices for the cases that previous papers did not 
include or the cases where our liberalization dates differ from those used in the past 
research. Interestingly, all liberalizations occurred prior to 2005. 
Finally, some special cases warrant additional attention. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Russia, and Ukraine emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991; Croatia 
and Slovenia became independent after the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991 and Czech 
and Slovakia emerged from the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993. All of them 
liberalized soon after independence, which could have been followed by social and 
economic turmoil. The second special case is China. Although China established a B-
                                                 
          24 
Whenever these two studies assign different dates for a country, we examine their reasons and 
determine the dates for our paper. 
       
25
Actually, we find twelve more liberalizing countries/regions during the period 1980-1997 that 
previous papers did not consider in their analyses: Chinese Taipei 1991, Russia 1991, Namibia 1992, 
Poland 1994, Lebanon 1994, Zambia 1994, Czech 1995, Hungary 1995, Estonia 1996, Latvia 1996, 
Ukraine 1996 and Cyprus 1997. 
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share market open to foreign investors in 1992, we do not treat that year as the 
liberalization date because the B-share market is quite small and illiquid compared with 
the A-share market, which is the principal stock market in China. Our preferred date is 
2003 when the A-share market opened to Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors 
(QFII). In the following analysis, robustness checks will be conducted without these 
countries.  
The remaining data is associated with country-level characteristics and primarily 
comes from the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI). Information on Taiwan is 
not available from the WDI. We obtain its data from other sources such as Penn World 
Table 7.1, Ministry of Education of Taiwan, and Ministry of the Interior of Taiwan. 
Table 3.2 lists all the variables used in this study and their sources. 
 
3.3. Replication 
We first replicate Bekaert et al. (2005)’s analysis concerning the effects of equity 
market liberalization on economic growth.
26
 Table 3.3 presents a summary of the results. 
Following their paper, we mainly adopt two different samples. One of them only 
includes the countries that liberalized during 1980-1997. We calculate the difference 
between the post-liberalization and pre-liberalization 5-year average growth rates of real 
per capita GDP in column (1). We then run three regressions with fixed effects, time 
effects and both in column (2) through (4) respectively. In each regression, the 
                                                 
       
26
Bekaert et al. (2005) also perform many robustness checks, compare equity market liberalization 
and capital account liberalization, explore the heterogeneity of the growth effect, attempt to address the 
endogeneity issue and in some regressions add the covariates one by one and eventually all together. We 
do not aim to replicate all their results. Instead, we only focus on their estimation of the growth effect, 
with a full set of independent variables. 
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dependent variable is the annual growth rate of real per capita GDP and the independent 
variable is a dummy that takes a value of one if the stock market is liberalized and zero 
otherwise. There are no other control variables used.  
The second sample depends on data availability. Growth rates of GDP per capita, 
the liberalization indicator, macroeconomic and demographic variables must all be 
available for the countries in this sample.
27
 It consists of both liberalizing countries and 
countries that never liberalized during 1980-1997. Two regressions are conducted using 
this sample. Column (5) reports the growth effect estimated in the OLS regressions. The 
dependent variable is non-overlapping five-year average growth rate. Three separate 
OLS regressions are carried out over three different periods (1981-1995, 1982-1996 and 
1983-1997), and the simple average of the three coefficients are presented. Finally, 
column (6) shows the results of a generalized method of moments described in detail in 
Bekaert et al. (2001, pp. 472-479). The dependent variable is overlapping five-year 
average growth rate. This GMM technique has several advantages. It allows researchers 
to better utilize the temporal components of the data and can adjust the standard errors 
for using overlapping observations. Additionally, with different weighting matrices, it 
can address heteroscedasticity across countries, heteroscedasticity across time and/or 
seemingly unrelated regression effects. 
As is shown in the first two rows of Table 3.3, while we are unable to precisely 
replicate Bekaert et al. (2005)’s findings, our results are close, with the same signs and 
                                                 
       
27
More specifically, the independent variables include the natural logarithm of GDP in 1980, 
government spending as a share of GDP, secondary school enrollment, population growth rate and the 
natural logarithm of the life expectancy. 
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similar coefficients.
28
 We then extend the analysis by using the updated data in the third 
through fifth rows and find that the growth effect of liberalization remains strong and 
significant, although OLS and GMM imply a slightly weaker effect. The results are also 
quite robust to excluding China and countries that emerged from the dissolutions of the 
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia.  
 
3.4. Addressing the Self-Selection Issue Using Matching 
Most previous research concerning the effects of equity market liberalization on 
economic outcomes treats liberalization decisions as if they are exogenous. However, it 
could be the case that countries select themselves into the liberalizing group based on a 
variety of economic factors. If this is true, the liberalizing countries may be 
fundamentally different than the rest of the countries such that the estimated average 
treatment effects generated by conventional regressions are biased. This section, 
therefore, is intended to address endogenous policy selection using propensity score 
matching.
29
 
 
3.4.1. Survival Analysis 
The first step of propensity score matching is to generate the propensity score using 
a probability model. A majority of studies employs either a probit or logit regression. 
However, since countries carry out liberalizations in different years, these two models 
                                                 
       
28
We collected data from the same source (mostly the WDI) as Bekaert et al. (2005) did, but still 
cannot precisely replicate BHL’s results. An important reason is that data from the WDI may have 
changed over time. For instance, we cannot find any observations on Jamaica’s real GDP per capita from 
the current WDI dataset and have to exclude it from our analysis while Bekaert et al. (2005) use it as a 
liberalization case.  
       
29
In order for our findings to be comparable with the existing literature, we use the same sample as in 
Bekaert et al. (2005) in our matching process. The results for the full sample are available in Appendix A. 
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may be unsuited for the policy under study as they fail to take account of the temporal 
feature of the treatment. Given this time-dependency and the fact that liberalization is 
rarely repealed, a hazard model is a good fit. Specifically, we use a Cox proportional 
hazard regression to model the liberalization decisions. The Cox model is convenient, 
reasonable, and most importantly valid to be used in PSM (see Lu (2005) for a proof). 
It is critical to correctly assign the right-hand-side variables for the hazard model, 
not only because it is essential to understand what factors are driving the liberalization 
reforms, but the policy predictors are exactly the covariates intended to be matched 
upon. Many studies employing PSM include as predictors only the variables that 
simultaneously affect policy adoption and the outcome variable. A few others 
exclusively control for the determinants of the former. These exercises could be 
inappropriate, as Cuong (2013) demonstrates with Monte Carlo simulations that when 
estimating the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), more efficiency can be 
gained if all the determinants of the outcome variable are used in the matching process, 
even if they do not influence the policy adoption. Rubin and Tomas (1996) also point 
out that a variable should not be excluded from the analysis unless there is a consensus 
that the variable is either irrelevant to the outcome or it is not a proper covariate. 
Intuitively, if we omit important variables that impact the outcome, the matched 
samples are likely to be unbalanced with respect to these ignored variables, which in 
turn can contribute to the difference in the outcome variable between the treatment and 
the control groups. After all, the ultimate goal of PSM is to allow fewer confounders 
(factors that affect the outcome) to interfere with the results. Therefore, we will include 
both determinants of policy adoption and determinants of GDP growth as covariates in 
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the estimation of the propensity scores. Finally, we lag all the covariates by one year to 
avoid contemporaneous endogeneity and to take into account the fact that a decision to 
liberalize is made before the policy is implemented. 
We mainly consider two sets of covariates. One of them is the policy predictors. 
Kaya et al. (2012) provide valuable guidance regarding the economic factors that drive 
the equity market liberalization decisions. They find that industrialization level, 
financial development, legal origin (a proxy for the quality of investor protection), 
government expenditure (a proxy for the level of government involvement in the 
economy), and received foreign aid are significantly correlated with the liberalization 
decisions. So these variables will be part of our right-hand-side variables. In particular, 
we use credit to the private sector rather than stock market turnover as a measure of 
financial development because the data of the latter are sparse. With regard to the legal 
origins, we use a dummy variable that indicates a legal system based on common law, 
which is consistent with the literature. 
The second set of covariates is the determinants of GDP growth. There is a rich 
pool of them and our choice of the covariates is primarily guided by Grier and Grier 
(2007). Investment, education, and technology are probably the most classical ones as 
they play important roles in nearly every neoclassical growth model. Investment was 
once deemed as a panacea for growth; education determines the level of human capital 
and the overall labor effectiveness; and technological advance is regarded as a major 
source of growth over the long run. We use investment as a share of GDP and primary 
school enrollment rate to represent investment and education, respectively. There are 
two variables, namely the expenditure on R&D and the number of patent applications 
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that the literature has frequently used to reflect technological progress. We choose the 
latter to take advantage of more observations.  
In addition to the classical ones, institution, inflation and initial GDP per capita are 
often deemed as determinants of growth as well. For example, in a highly influential 
paper, Acemoglu et al. (2001) show that institutions have large effects on the long-term 
economic performance. We use political constraints on the executive as a measure of 
institutional quality. Inflation can also affect growth. Evidence has been found that both 
inflation per se and inflation uncertainty are detrimental to growth (Barro, 1996; Grier 
and Grier, 2006). We use GDP deflator to represent inflation. According to the 
convergence hypothesis in economics, countries with a lower starting level of real per 
capita GDP tend to grow at a higher rate than richer economies. While the validity of 
this notion has long been a dispute, empirical studies routinely include the initial GDP 
level as a growth predictor. Finally, to take account of current account and capital 
account liberalization that may go in tandem with stock market liberalization, we 
control for openness to trade as well as the Chinn-Ito index, a de jure measure of 
financial openness, in our regression.  
Ideally, every covariate described above can be used in the survival analysis (and 
subsequently controlled for in matching) such that the results will be least biased. 
However, due to the data constraints, more covariates come at the cost of smaller 
samples, which reduce the precision of the estimators. In Table 3.4, we report the results 
of the Cox hazard regressions. Column (1) has the most parsimonious specification but 
take into account 40 liberalizing countries. Column (3) has a full set of covariates but 
suffers from a small sample bias. In the face of the tradeoff, we also use a third 
 70 
 
specification in column (2), which considers most covariates (11 out of 13) and still 
retains 36 treated countries.
30
 Despite the different explanatory variables included in the 
regressions, our results largely confirm Kaya et al. (2012)’s findings. Countries with 
common law legal origins are more likely to liberalize as they tend to provide better 
protection of investors’ rights. Government size is inversely related to the probability of 
liberalization because a big government that uses political power to allocate resources is 
less likely to approve liberalization. Better financial development drives liberalization 
given that a sound financial system would be more capable of absorbing and utilizing 
foreign capital. The level of industrialization is also positively associated with 
liberalization since an agricultural country is less likely to open its stock market. Finally, 
more received financial aid tends to stimulate liberalization as it helps strengthen the 
reforms in policies and institution (Kaya et al., 2012). 
One might be concerned that only a few covariates exert a significant impact on the 
dependent variable. However, since the primary purpose of matching is to balance the 
distribution of these covariates such that the treatment group and the control group are 
similar and comparable, rather than to accurately estimate each covariate's effect on 
policy adoption, all the covariates in the model will be retained.  
 
3.4.2. Matching 
In this subsection, we match the treated country-years to a control group based on 
the fitted values generated in the hazard regressions. It is convenient to use the linear 
portion of hazard (i.e. the estimated value of Xβ in the Cox hazards model) as the 
                                                 
       
30
Actually, the results are fairly robust to a diversity of specifications, not limited to the three that we 
report. 
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propensity score (Lu, 2005; Ufier, 2014). Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of 
propensity scores for both the treated and control groups. To make sure that the treated 
and control units share a common support, we drop treated observations whose 
propensity scores are above the maximum or below the minimum of the controls’. 
Various matching techniques can then be chosen, among which single nearest neighbor 
matching with replacement is the most commonly used one. In this method, each 
liberalizing country-year is matched with another country-year that has not liberalized 
and has the closest propensity score. Other matching methods such as radius matching 
and kernel matching are also popular. See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1985) for more 
details about matching estimator properties and Dehejia and Wahba (2002) for a 
discussion of choosing appropriate matching methods under different circumstances. In 
this paper, we employ kernel (normal) matching as our primary method because it uses 
every potential control country within the common support and that it appears to be 
more capable of creating control groups with balanced covariates in this study. We will 
also report other matching results as robustness checks.  
Given that the propensity scores are estimated for every country in every year, our 
matching algorisms allow the treated countries to be matched to controls in different 
years than the liberalization dates, as long as they closely resemble each other and have 
similar propensity to liberalize. This tremendously expands the number of potential 
controls and helps find much better matches on the observed covariates. Each treated 
country is matched to one or more countries in the control pool, which contains 
countries that are exposed to treatment in later years as well as those that are never 
treated. As we seek to assess the average growth effects over time for 10 years, the 
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controls must not be treated within 10 years. Therefore, countries 10 years or less before 
they liberalize should also be excluded from the control pool. 
After matching, it is important to verify that the differences in observable 
confounders between the treatment group and the control group have been eliminated or 
at least reduced to ensure an unbiased estimate. Table 3.5 shows the result of kernel 
(normal) matching by comparing the means of covariates used in specification (3) of 
Table 3.3.
31
 It turns out that the covariate balance is well achieved: Prior to matching, 8 
covariates show a statistically significant difference at the 10% level, and all of them 
disappear after matching. 
 
3.4.3. Results  
Having obtained properly matched treated group and control group, one may be 
tempted to directly compare the average post-treatment GDP growth rate between these 
two groups. However, it might be the case that the treated countries have been 
experiencing a higher growth rate prior to liberalization and would have grown at a 
higher rate had liberalization not taken place. This can result in a false estimate of a 
positive effect of liberalization on growth even if it has no effect at all. To address the 
issue, we adopt a difference-in-difference analysis by comparing the change in the 
growth rate (i.e. the dependent variable is N-year average post-treatment growth rate 
less N-year average pre-treatment growth rate, N being 1, 2,…,10) between the treated 
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We also check covariate balances for other hazard model specifications and for other matching 
techniques. When fewer covariates are included (i.e. using column 1 or 2 in table 3), balance is almost 
always well achieved. When column 3 of table 3 is used, 13 covariates need to be balanced at a time. 
Occasionally one or two unbalanced covariates may show up. In this situation, we modify the hazard 
regressions by adding higher order terms of some covariates and redo matching. In essence, this exercise 
alters the weights of the covariates in matching. Refer to Dehejia and Wahba (2002) for details.  
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and control groups.
32, 33, 34
 Another benefit associated with the difference-in-difference 
matching is that it differences out the time-invariant unobservable confounders which 
matching could not control for. The results are reported in Table 3.6: Equity market 
liberalization stimulates growth substantially, which is robust to various matching 
methods. When the smallest sample (panel 1) is used, liberalizing countries enjoy a 
huge bonus growth rate immediately (more than 3%), and the effect remains about 1% 
throughout. When the sample size is larger (panel 2 and 3), we obtain a higher statistical 
significance. There is strong evidence of a substantial gain (about 1.5%-3%) in the 
short-term and weak evidence of an appreciable gain over the long run: most estimates 
for 9-year or 10-year average growth effects are above 0.9% with the statistical 
significance below or close to the 10% level. This estimate, 0.9% annually for a whole 
decade, should be big enough to arouse the interests of political leaders whose countries 
have yet to liberalize their stock markets. Compared with the literature, our findings are 
largely in accordance with the results in Bekaert et al. (2005) and Fuchs-Schundeln et al. 
(2003), who find an average growth effect of about 1% after liberalization. But our 
estimates indicate a stronger effect in the first two years after liberalization and hint at a 
more sustainable effect that persists for 10 years. We also conduct matching analysis for 
our expanded data. The results are presented in Table 3.7. The addition of the new cases 
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The post-treatment growth rates do not include the rate in the liberalization year because 
liberalization could occur at the end of the year. It is inappropriate to view that year as post-treatment and 
the estimated effect in that year is expected to be misleadingly small. 
       
33
Another way to deal with the reverse causation issue is to include pre-treatment growth rate as a 
variable to be matched upon. The problem with this method is, in most cases, even though the pre-
treatment growth rates are balanced between the treated group and the control group (which means they 
are not statistically significantly different), their difference can still be large enough to affect the results. 
For example, 3.89% and 4.85% are statistically different at the 30.1% significance level, which passes the 
covariance balance test. But their difference almost reaches 1%. 
       
34
Note that a positive effect could either because treated countries grow faster after liberalization or 
because control countries grow slower or both. This explains some of the surprisingly large estimates we 
obtain. 
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seems to diminish the immediate effect. But the results are generally still supportive of 
the conclusion that liberalization promotes economic growth by about one percentage 
point annually. 
 
3.4.4. Placebo Test 
It is of interest to know whether the results we obtain above truly come from 
liberalization rather than due to randomness. A placebo test is carried out where we 
apply the same matching techniques to the liberalizing countries, but the liberalization 
dates are artificially moved to 10 years prior to the true dates. We then examine the one-
year through ten-year average growth effects associated with these imaginary policy 
interventions. Since the liberalizations did not actually occur, we expect the estimates of 
the growth effects to be statistically indistinguishable from zero. Table 3.8 confirms our 
conjecture that the results can be either positive or negative and most importantly, none 
of them are significant at the 10% level.  
 
3.4.5. Does matching make a difference?  
This subsection demonstrates why matching is important by comparing our 
matching results with the results obtained from panel regressions. Following Fuchs-
Schundeln et al. (2003), we specify a standard growth regression that is commonly used 
in the literature: 
 
(1)                 Growthit=αi + yeart + β0lib0it + β1lib1it + β2lib2it + β3lib3it + β4lib4it + 
β5lib5it 
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              + β6lib6it + β7lib7it + β8lib8it + β9lib9it + β10lib10it + γ’Xit+εit. 
 
where the dependent variable is the real GDP growth rate per capita of country i in year 
t. Dummy lib0 takes the value of one in the year of liberalization and zero otherwise. 
Similarly, lib1-lib10 refer to the dummies indicating the years after liberalization. X is a 
vector of independent variables that we have used in the matching process. In addition, 
we control for country fixed effect “αi” to alleviate potential omitted variable bias and 
year fixed effect “yeart” to account for possible worldwide growth trend or common 
external shocks that impact every country. For comparison, we also include pooled OLS 
and country fixed effect regression.  
The results are reported in Table 3.9. Consistent with Bekaert et al. (2005) and 
Fuchs-Schundeln et al. (2003), these regressions capture a 1% to 2% annual growth 
effect for three or four post-treatment years. Beyond this time window, the coefficients 
are mostly small, insignificant, and even negative. In order to make them comparable 
with the matching results, we calculate the N-year average effect, N=1,…,10, using the 
following simple algorithm: N-year average effect=
       
 
, where Libi is the fitted value 
in each regression. Table 3.10 shows the results. The second column represents the 
estimates from the kernel (normal) matching, which is copied from the second column 
of Table 3.6, and the remaining columns represent results from panel regressions. We 
find two important patterns: first, all regressions tend to underestimate the immediate 
growth effect of liberalization. While matching reveals a 1.5% to 4% growth spurt in 
the year after liberalization, estimates from regressions are all below 1.5%. Second, 
regressions fail to recognize the persistence of the growth effect. Their results are 
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typically much smaller than the matching results. In sum, matching does make a 
difference. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The past three decades have witnessed a large number of equity market 
liberalizations. The existing literature finds mixed evidence on the growth effect 
associated with liberalization. However, none of them has studied liberalization cases 
after 1999. In this study, we augment the analysis by extending the liberalization cases 
through 2011 and including the cases they have overlooked. We closely mimic Bekaert 
et al, (2005) and apply their methods on our updated data. Consistent with their results, 
we find strong evidence that liberalization leads to a sizable increase in annual real 
economic growth. We also argue that endogenous policy selection is an important issue 
that conventional regressions are unable to address. Therefore, we use propensity score 
matching to control for the selection bias and find that the growth effect of liberalization 
is likely to persist for a whole decade, which is much longer than the literature has 
documented.  
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Table 3.1: Countries that Officially Adopted Equity Market Liberalization and Their 
Starting Years 
Country Bekaert et al. 
(2005) 
1980-1997 
Fuchs-Schundeln 
(2003)  
1980-1995 
This Paper 
1980-2011 
Reason for the Dates 
Argentina 1989 1989 1989  
Bangladesh 1991  1991  
Botswana 1990  1990  
Brazil 1991 1991 1991  
Chile 1992 1992 1992  
Colombia 1991 1991 1991  
Cote d’Ivoire 1995  1995  
Ecuador 1994  1994  
Egypt 1992 1993 1992  
Ghana 1993  1993  
Greece 1987 1986 1987  
Iceland 1991  1991  
India 1992 1992 1992  
Indonesia 1989 1989 1989  
Jamaica 1991  1991  
Japan 1983 1980 1980  
Jordan 1995 1995 1995  
Kenya 1995  1995  
Korea, Republic of 1992 1992 1992  
Malaysia 1988 1988 1988  
Malta 1992  1992  
Mauritius 1994  1994  
Mexico 1989 1989 1989  
Morocco 1988 1994 1994  
New Zealand 1987  1987  
Nigeria 1995 1995 1995  
Pakistan 1991 1991 1991  
Peru 1992 1991 1991  
Philippines 1991 1991 1991  
Portugal 1986 1986 1986  
Saudi Arabia 1999  1999  
South Africa 1996 1995 1996  
Spain 1985 1985 1985  
Sri Lanka 1991 1990 1990  
Thailand 1987 1987 1987  
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
1997  1997  
Tunisia 1995  1995  
Turkey 1989 1989 1989  
Venezuela 1990 1990 1990  
Zimbabwe 1993 1993 1993  
Bahrain   1999 …loosening foreign investment 
restrictions on listed equities. 
Foreigners are entitled to invest in 
up to 49% of a domestic public-
shareholding company's equities, 
while seven banks are 100% open to 
foreign investors 
Bulgaria   1998 Kouretas (2012) 
Cyprus   1997 In February 1997, the government 
revised its policy on FDI, permitting 
100% foreign ownership in certain 
cases. Regulations on foreign 
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portfolio investment in the Cyprus 
Stock Exchange also have been 
liberalized.  
Hungary   1995 Under the new foreign exchange 
law, some capital account 
restrictions were eliminated; 
foreigners were allowed to buy most 
Hungarian securities with maturities 
longer than one year without 
obtaining permission from the 
National Bank, and outward equity 
investment was permitted, provided 
that an equity share of over 10% is 
acquired. 
Kuwait   2000 The National Assembly ratified the  
"Indirect Foreign Investment Law" 
in August 2000, allowing foreigners 
to own 100 percent of all listed 
shareholding companies, 
except banks. 
Lebanon   1994 The Investment Development 
Authority of Lebanon was created to 
support foreign investors. With very 
few exceptions, there is no 
discrimination between national and 
foreign investments 
Oman 1999  1998 Information from Kim et al. (2007), 
Mansur et al. (2008), Azzam (2013) 
and Hassan et al. (2003) 
Qatar   2003 In December 2003, the Cabinet of 
Ministers approved a law allowing 
foreigners to own up to 25 percent 
of a company listed in the DSM 
(Doha Securities Market). 
Namibia   1992 The Stock Exchanges Control Act 
was amended. There are no 
restrictions on foreign investment 
(although foreigners need special 
permission if they wish to take over 
control of a bank). 
Poland   1994 Portfolio investment on the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange was liberalized in 
September 1994. 
Romania   1998 Kouretas (2012) 
Taiwan, China   1991 …implementation date of phase two 
of liberalization plan. Eligible 
foreign institutional investors may 
now invest directly in Taiwan 
securities if they have applied for 
and received SEC approval as a 
qualified foreign institutional 
investor (QFII). Each foreign 
institution is limited to holding a 
maximum of 5% of any listed stock 
and total foreign holdings in any 
listed companies may not exceed 
10%. 
United Arab 
Emirates 
  2004 Ministry of Economy and Planning  
rules allow foreign investment up to 
49 percent in companies on the 
stock market; however, company 
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by-laws  
in many cases prohibit or limit 
foreign ownership. 
Vietnam   2003 …as part of its efforts  
to encourage foreign investment and 
to promote the development of the 
infant stock market, the Government 
issued Decision 146 in July 
2003 abolishing the equity limit of a 
single foreign investor (institutional 
or individual) in a listed  
Vietnamese company. 
Zambia   1994 A stock exchange was introduced in 
1994. Participation on both the bond 
and stock markets was open to not 
only residents but non-residents as 
well. 
Other Cases 
China  2003  The A-share market is open to QFII 
(Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investors) in 2003. 
Croatia  1998  FDI, inward portfolio investments, 
and profit transfers abroad are not 
restricted. 
Czech  1995  Most capital transactions were de 
jure liberalized with the enactment 
of the new Foreign Exchange Act in 
September 1995, including short-
term portfolio and credit inflows. 
Estonia  1996  The Tallin Stock Exchange opened, 
and foreign investment service firms 
can operate there. 
Latvia  1996  Amendments to the Investment Law 
passed in 1996 removed virtually all 
restrictions on foreign investment. 
Securities markets are regulated by 
the 1996 Law on Securities and 
some other laws. 
Lithuania  1999  Kouretas (2012) 
Russia  1991  The 1991 investment code 
guaranteed foreign investors rights 
equal to those enjoyed by Russian 
investors. 
Slovakia  1998  Kouretas (2012) 
Slovenia  2001  Bank of Slovenia lifted all 
restrictions on foreign portfolio 
investments in the Slovenian capital 
market. 
Ukraine  1996  The Foreign Investment Law 
passed. It guarantees foreign 
investors equal treatment with local 
companies, and the "unhindered 
transfer" of profits, revenues, and 
other proceeds in foreign currency 
after covering taxes and other 
mandatory payments. 
       Notes:  
    
a
The data are mainly from Bekaert et al. (2005), Fuchs-Schundeln et al. (2003), Global Stock 
Market Factbook by S&P, Investment Climate Statements from U.S. Department of State and A 
Chronology of Important Financial, Economic and Political Events in Emerging Markets at 
http://www.duke.edu/~charvey/Country risk/Chronology/.   
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b
The data cover period 1980 to 2011, although all cases are before 2005.  
     
c
For liberalization dates before 1997, if Bekaert et al. (2005) and Fuchs-Schundeln et al. (2003) 
use different dates for a country, we examine their reasons and determine the dates for our paper. 
     
d
Nations and years in the italic font are cases that previous studies on growth effect of 
liberalization did not include or cases where our liberalization dates differ from those in the existing 
literature. For these cases, we provide the reasons for our date choices or the data sources. 
     
e“Other cases” include (1) Countries that emerged from the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991; 
(2) Croatia and Slovenia, which became independent after the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991 (3) Czech 
and Slovakia, which came from the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993; (4) China where foreign 
access to "A" stocks is still very limited due to the quotas assigning to foreign investors.
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 Table 3.2: Descriptions of Variables and Data Sources 
       Notes: Taiwan, China is not listed as a separate economy in World Bank Development Indicators. 
We compile data for Taiwan from other sources such as Penn World Table, Ministry of Education of 
Taiwan and Ministry of the Interior of Taiwan. 
Official liberalization 
date 
The year when the equity market is officially liberalized.  
Source: Bekaert et al. (2005), http://www.duke.edu/~charvey/Country 
risk/Chronology/ and  Maria-Lenuta et al. (2011)  
Legal Origin Equals one if the origin of the commercial law of a country is English 
Common Law, and zero otherwise.  
Source:  La Porta et al. (1999). 
Industrialization level Value added in industry as a share of GDP.  
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
Government 
expenditure 
General government final consumption as a share of GDP. Source: World 
Bank Development Indicators 
Private credit Credit to private sector divided by GDP.  
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
Inflation Inflation measured by GDP deflator.  
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
Real Per capita GDP Per capita GDP (2005 $) 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
Real GDP growth rate Growth rate of real GDP per capita 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
Financial aid Development assistance and financial aid received ($) 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
Primary school 
enrollment 
% of gross primary school enrollment 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
Population growth 
rate 
Growth rate of total population 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
Life expectancy Life expectancy indicating the number of years a newborn infant would live 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
Patents applications Number of patents applications 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
Chinn-Ito index 
 
A measure of capital account openness 
Source: http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm 
Investment rate Investment as a share of GDP 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
Investment growth 
rate 
The growth rate of private investment 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
Political constraints 
on the chief executive 
Political constraints on the chief executive 
Source: Polity IV 
Openness to trade Import plus export, as a share of GDP 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
Net equity inflows Net inflows from equity securities including shares, stocks, depository 
receipts and direct purchases of shares in local stock markets by foreign 
investors Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
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Table 3.3: Results of Replication and Extensions 
          Dependent variable: real per capita GDP growth rate (%) 
 Only liberalizing countries All countries that have data 
 Before-after 
difference 
 
(1) 
Fixed 
effect 
 
(2) 
Year 
 effect 
 
(3) 
Fixed and 
year effect 
 
(4) 
OLS 
  
 
(5) 
GMM 
 
 
          (6) 
Bekaert et al. 
(2005) 
1.17*** 1.24*** 2.02*** 1.05** 1.20***       0.97*** 
Replication 1.21*** 1.50*** 2.28*** 1.08 1.19***       0.96*** 
All cases 1.43*** 1.71*** 1.52*** 1.73** 1.12***       0.81*** 
All cases except 
special Eastern 
European 
Countries 
1.13*** 1.25*** 1.17*** 1.22* 0.89***  0.81*** 
All cases except 
China 
1.40*** 1.71*** 2.02*** 1.80** 1.01***  0.82*** 
        Notes: Following Bakeart et al. (2005), two different samples are considered. One of them (the first four 
columns) only includes the countries that liberalized during 1980-1997. Column (1) reports the difference 
between the post-liberalization and pre-liberalization 5-year average growth rates. Column (2) through 
Column (4) report the estimates of the growth effects of equity market liberalization from three regressions 
with fixed effects, time effects and both, respectively. In each regression, the dependent variable is the 
annual growth rate of real per capita GDP and the independent variable is a dummy that takes a value of one 
if the stock market is liberalized and zero otherwise. There are no other control variables used.  Column (5) 
and (6) represents the second sample, which depends on data availability: economic growth rates, the 
liberalization indicator as well as macroeconomic and demographic variables must all be available for the 
countries in this sample. It consists of both liberalizing countries and countries that never liberalized in the 
period under study. Column (5) reports the growth effect estimated from the OLS regressions. The 
dependent variable is non-overlapping five-year average growth rate. Three separate OLS regressions are 
carried out over three different periods (1981-1995, 1982-1996 and 1983-1997), and the simple average of 
the three coefficients are presented. Column (6) shows the results of a generalized method of moments 
(GMM). The dependent variable is overlapping five-year average growth rate. This GMM method allows 
researchers to better utilize the temporal components of the data and can adjust the standard errors for using 
overlapping observations. With different weighting matrices, it accommodates temporal heteroscedasticity, 
cross-country heteroscedasticity and/or SUR effects. *p<0.10, **p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
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   Table 3.4: Results of Cox Hazard Regressions 
Dependent variable: Dummy variable indicating stock market liberalization 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Real Per capita GDP ($1000) -0.033** -0.075** 0.139*** 
Government expenditure -0.038 -0.076* -0.188*** 
Investment rate 0.034** 0.011 0.025 
Openness to trade -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.020 
Common law 1.936*** 2.283*** 3.158*** 
Inflation 0.0001 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 
Chinn-Ito index  -0.157 -0.144 
Private credit  0.075*** 0.008 
Constraints on executives  0.211*** 0.158 
Industry  0.071*** 0.064* 
Primary school enrollment  0.003 -0.002 
Financial aid   2.362 
Patent applications   -0.000 
Observations 2753 2078 659 
Liberalizations 40 36 22 
                   Notes:  
                   
a
This table reports the results of Cox proportional hazard regressions.  
                   
b
Column (1), (2) and (3) refer to samples of 40, 36 and 22 countries, respectively.  
                   
c
The dependent variable is a dummy indicating official liberalizations. 
                   
d
All covariates are lagged by one year. 
                   
e
*p<0.10, **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
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Table 3.5: Covariates Balance Check 
Covariate Sample Treated Control t-statistic P-value 
Real per capita GDP 
($1000) 
Unmatched 2971.1 1904.4 2.59** 0.01 
 Matched 3023.6 2639.7 0.46 0.649 
Government 
expenditure 
Unmatched 12.691 14.29 1.59 0.113 
 Matched 12.87 11.485 1.20 0.237 
Investment rate Unmatched 22.208 23.225 0.57 0.570 
 Matched 22.546 26.948 1.62 0.113 
Openness to trade Unmatched 55.915 71.342 1.84* 0.066 
 Matched 57.098 50.923 0.73 0.470 
Common law Unmatched 0.318 0.019 7.62*** 0.000 
 Matched 0.333 0.286 0.33 0.746 
Chinn-Ito index Unmatched -0.678 -0.365 1.01 0.313 
 Matched -0.621 -0.400 0.55 0.582 
Inflation Unmatched 371.84 25.02 5.08*** 0.000 
 Matched 149.13 34.66 0.85 0.400 
Private credit Unmatched 37.32 24.29 3.00*** 0.003 
 Matched 38.51 31.58 0.97 0.339 
Constraints on 
executives 
Unmatched 5.36 2.20 1.16 0.246 
 Matched 5.29 4.47 1.30 0.202 
Industry Unmatched 34.495 30.908 1.65* 0.099 
 Matched 34.753 33.821 0.32 0.749 
Primary school 
enrollment 
Unmatched 102.68 99.37 0.94 0.349 
 Matched 101.92 93.49 1.37 0.178 
Financial aid Unmatched 0.027 0.052 1.79* 0.075 
 Matched 0.028 0.036 0.53 0.598 
Patent applications Unmatched 2815.4 542.7 5.00*** 0.000 
 Matched 2936.7 1219.1 1.22 0.229 
         Notes:  
         
a
The 13 variables are the same as in Col (3) of Table 3.  
                
b
The control group is generated using kernel (normal) matching. 
                
c
When Col (1) or Col (2) of Table 3 is used, covariate balance is easier to achieve due to a smaller    
number of    covariates. Their balance check tables are available upon request. 
                
d
*p<0.10, **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
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Table 3.6: Effects on Growth Using Matching 
         Notes:  
              a
This table represents results from propensity score matching.  
         
b
The data covers liberalization cases between 1980 and 1999. The first panel controls for the most 
covariates and has the fewest liberalization cases. This sample corresponds to column (3) of Table 3. 
The second panel corresponds to column (2) of Table 3. The third panel controls for the fewest 
covariates but has the largest sample which corresponds to column (1) of Table 3. 
         
c
As we seek to evaluate the average real GDP per capita growth effects over time for 10 years, 
countries 10 years or less before they liberalize cannot be included in the control group. 
         
d
The outcome variable is the change in the average growth rate before and after liberalizations. 
         
e
All covariates are lagged by one year to avoid simultaneous endogeneity. 
         
f
The post-liberalization period does not include the year of liberalization. 
         
g
The number of nearest neighbors is 2. 
         
h
We also experiment with other matching methods by using different numbers of nearest 
neighbors, applying different kernels and setting different radiuses. The results do not alter our major 
conclusions. 
         
i
*p<0.10, **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
  
Results with 13 covariates N=22 Kernel (Normal) Nearest Neighbor Radius=0.1 
1-year average 4.17** 4.36*** 3.30* 
2-year average 2.38* 2.69** 1.90* 
3-year average 2.48* 2.15* 1.46 
4-year average 2.23* 1.80* 1.16 
5-year average 1.59 1.20 0.70 
6-year average 1.52 0.71 0.57 
7-year average 1.44 0.89 0.99 
8-year average 1.21 0.89 0.86 
9-year average 1.20 0.89 0.92 
10-year average 1.38 1.11 0.95 
Results with 11 covariates N=36 Kernel (Normal) Nearest Neighbor Radius=0.1 
1-year average 2.50** 1.62 2.83*** 
2-year average 2.37*** 2.64*** 2.37*** 
3-year average 2.27*** 2.63*** 2.22*** 
4-year average 1.99*** 2.10*** 1.89*** 
5-year average 1.57*** 1.52** 1.45*** 
6-year average 1.30*** 1.16* 1.24** 
7-year average 1.12** 0.89 1.12** 
8-year average 1.03** 0.78 1.00** 
9-year average 1.10** 1.23** 1.03** 
10-year average 1.00** 1.22** 0.88** 
Results with 6 covariates N=40 Kernel (Normal) Nearest Neighbor Radius=0.1 
1-year average 2.25*** 2.49** 2.32*** 
2-year average 1.92*** 2.18** 1.92*** 
3-year average 1.74*** 1.83** 1.72*** 
4-year average 1.45*** 1.46** 1.45*** 
5-year average 1.00** 0.99* 1.01** 
6-year average 0.91** 0.86 0.91** 
7-year average 0.96** 0.89* 0.98** 
8-year average 1.02** 1.00** 1.04** 
9-year average 1.10*** 1.14** 1.12*** 
10-year average 1.02*** 1.19** 1.02*** 
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 Table 3.7: Effects on Growth Using Matching (All Cases) 
        Notes:  
           a
This table represents results from propensity score matching.  
           b
The data covers liberalizations between 1980 and 2011.  
           c
As we seek to evaluate the average real GDP per capita growth effects over time for 10 years, 
countries 10 years or less before they liberalize cannot be included in the control group. 
           d
The outcome variable is the change in the average growth rate before and after liberalizations. 
e.g., the 5-year average growth rate change is 5-year post-liberalization average growth rate less 5-
year pre-liberalization average growth rate. 
           e
All covariates are lagged by one year to avoid simultaneous endogeneity. 
           f
The post-liberalization period does not include the year of liberalization. 
           g 
***,**,* denote significance at the 1, the 5, and the 10 percent level. 
 
  
Results with 13 covariates N=32 Kernel (Normal) Nearest Neighbor Radius=0.05 
1-year average 2.42** 1.70 2.16 
2-year average 1.67** 1.27 1.77* 
3-year average 1.88*** 1.70* 2.25*** 
4-year average 1.87*** 2.05** 2.45*** 
5-year average 1.75*** 1.76** 2.44*** 
6-year average 1.92*** 1.92** 2.49*** 
7-year average 2.58*** 2.64*** 3.02*** 
8-year average 2.59*** 2.63*** 2.87*** 
9-year average 1.61** 1.59** 1.99** 
10-year average 1.31** 1.45* 1.69** 
Results with 11 covariates N=49 Kernel (Normal) Nearest Neighbor Radius=0.05 
1-year average 1.85** 1.01 1.33 
2-year average 1.18* 1.49 1.30* 
3-year average 1.63** 2.24** 1.57** 
4-year average 1.73*** 2.59** 1.63** 
5-year average 1.18** 1.34 1.01* 
6-year average 1.21** 1.12 1.03* 
7-year average 1.17** 1.16 1.19* 
8-year average 1.13* 1.14 1.10* 
9-year average 1.11** 1.08 1.12** 
10-year average 1.12** 0.96 1.17** 
Results with 6 covariates N=65 Kernel (Normal) Nearest Neighbor Radius=0.05 
1-year average 0.90 1.03 0.94 
2-year average 1.23** 1.71* 1.35** 
3-year average 1.30* 1.71* 1.42** 
4-year average 1.31** 1.38 1.41** 
5-year average 1.22** 0.67 1.26** 
6-year average 1.33** 0.88 1.35** 
7-year average 1.38** 1.00 1.39** 
8-year average 1.39** 0.97 1.40** 
9-year average 1.18** 0.77 1.18** 
10-year average 1.13** 0.76 1.11** 
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  Table 3.8: Placebo Test 
 Number of 
covariates=13 
Number of 
covariates=11 
Number of 
covariates=6 
1-year average -0.34 0.47 0.87 
2-year average -0.64 0.82 0.77 
3-year average -0.94 0.73 0.56 
4-year average -0.72 0.86 0.68 
5-year average -0.71 0.55 0.44 
6-year average -0.23 0.40 0.25 
7-year average 0.06 0.29 0.15 
8-year average 0.25 -0.06 -0.15 
9-year average 0.22 -0.24 -0.33 
10-year average 0.48 0.21 -0.00 
                        Notes:  
                        
a
This table represents the matching results as if the liberalizations had occurred ten years before 
the  true liberalization dates.  
                        
b
Kernel matching is applied, kernel being normal. 
                        
c
*p<0.10, **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
 
 
 88 
 
 
 Table 3.9: Results from Panel Regressions 
Ctrls (1) (2) (3) 
Regre
ssion 
OLS FE Two-
way FE 
OLS FE Two-
way FE 
OLS FE Two-way 
FE 
Lib0 0.13 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.38 0.46 0.11 0.70 0.83 
Lib1 0.85 0.90 0.82 0.49 0.70 0.75 -0.04 0.25 0.40 
Lib2 1.05** 1.11** 1.11** 1.13* 1.40** 1.57** 1.06 1.51 1.81* 
Lib3 1.32*** 1.42*** 1.41** 0.82 1.23** 1.30** 1.27* 1.85*** 2.25*** 
Lib4 0.55 0.68* 0.57 0.55 0.82 0.85 1.08** 1.49*** 2.04*** 
Lib5 0.12 0.22 -0.11 -0.12 0.26 0.19 -0.41 0.28 0.47 
Lib6 0.09 0.12 -0.17 0.04 0.42 0.32 -1.06 -0.49 0.01 
Lib7 0.61 0.66 0.45 0.47 0.86 0.87 0.51 1.27* 1.98*** 
Lib8 0.47 0.52 0.11 0.29 0.56 0.25 0.46 1.01 1.25* 
Lib9 0.91 0.89 0.43 1.23 1.47 1.09 -0.04 0.32 0.45 
Lib10 -0.85 -0.83 -1.43** -0.98 -0.74 -1.02* -1.55 -1.09 -0.75 
Obs 4276 4276 4276 3132 3132 3132 1118 1118 1118 
        Notes: 
           a
Dependent variable: Real Growth Rate Per Capita 
           b
Lib0 denotes the year of liberalization. Lib1 denotes 1 year after liberalization, so on and so forth 
       
c
White robust standard errors are used. 
           d
Controls (1), (2) and (3) mean controlling for explanatory variables used in column (1), (2) and (3) 
of the table respectively. 
          e
Data cover 1980-2010 
          f 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
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   Table 3.10: Comparing Matching Results and Regression Results 
Number of 
covariates=13 
Kernel (Normal) 
Matching 
Pooled OLS FE Two-way 
FE 
1-year average 4.17 -0.04 0.25 0.40 
2-year average 2.38 0.51 0.88 1.11 
3-year average 2.48 0.76 1.20 1.49 
4-year average 2.23 0.84 1.28 1.63 
5-year average 1.59 0.59 1.08 1.39 
6-year average 1.52 0.32 0.82 1.16 
7-year average 1.44 0.34 0.88 1.28 
8-year average 1.21 0.36 0.90 1.28 
9-year average 1.20 0.31 0.83 1.18 
10-year average 1.38 0.13 0.64 0.99 
Number of 
covariates=11 
Kernel (Normal) 
Matching 
   
1-year average 2.50 0.49 0.70 0.75 
2-year average 2.37 0.81 1.05 1.16 
3-year average 2.27 0.81 1.11 1.21 
4-year average 1.99 0.75 1.04 1.12 
5-year average 1.57 0.57 0.88 0.93 
6-year average 1.30 0.49 0.81 0.83 
7-year average 1.12 0.48 0.81 0.84 
8-year average 1.03 0.46 0.78 0.76 
9-year average 1.10 0.54 0.86 0.80 
10-year average 1.00 0.39 0.70 0.62 
Number of  
covariates=6 
Kernel (Normal) 
Matching 
   
1-year average 2.25 0.85 0.90 0.82 
2-year average 1.92 0.95 1.01 0.97 
3-year average 1.74 1.07 1.14 1.11 
4-year average 1.45 0.94 1.03 0.98 
5-year average 1.00 0.78 0.87 0.76 
6-year average 0.91 0.66 0.74 0.61 
7-year average 0.96 0.66 0.73 0.58 
8-year average 1.02 0.63 0.70 0.52 
9-year average 1.10 0.66 0.72 0.51 
10-year average 1.02 0.51 0.57 0.32 
         Notes:  
              a
The second column is copied from the second column of Table 5. 
         
b
For the third, fourth and fifth column, the average growth effects are computed using the results  
in Table 6. Algorism: N-year average effect=
       
 
, where Libi is the fitted value in each regression.  
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   Figure 3.1: Distribution of Propensity Scores       
                                                           Panel I                                                                           Panel II 
 
Kernel: Epanechnikov;  No. of Treated Countries: 22.       Kernel: Epan; No. of Treated Countries: 36. 
 
                                          Panel III 
 
           Kernel: Epan;  No. of Treated Countries: 40. 
 91 
 
References 
Abadie, A. and J. Gardeazabal, "The economic costs of conflict: A case study of the 
Basque Country," American economic review 113-132, 2003. 
Abadie, A., A. Diamond, and J. Hainmueller, "Synthetic control methods for 
comparative case studies: Estimating the effect of California’s tobacco control 
program," Journal of the American Statistical Association, 105, 493-505, 2010. 
_________, "Comparative politics and the synthetic control method," American Journal 
of Political Science, 59, 495-510, 2015. 
Anderson, Michael L., and Maximilian Auffhammer, "Pounds that kill: the external 
costs of vehicle weight," The Review of Economic Studies, 81: 535-571, 2014. 
Andrade, E., F. Veloso, R. Madalozzo, and S. Ferreira, “Do borrowing constraints 
decrease intergenerational mobility? Evidence from Brazil,” Sao Paulo, Brazil: Banco 
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES). Mimeographed document, 
2004. 
Atkinson, A., A. Maynard, C. Trinder, J. Corlyon, S. Jenkins, and H. Sutherland, 
Parents and children: incomes in two generations, Heinemann Educational Books, 
London, 1983. 
Azzam, H., Emerging Arab Capital Markets, Routledge, 2013. 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review, 91, 1369-1401, 
2001.  
Bae, K. and V. Goyal, “Equity market liberalization and corporate 
governance,” Journal of Corporate Finance, 16, 609-621, 2010. 
Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Esther Duflo, "The Economic Lives of the Poor." Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 21, 141-168, 2007. 
Barro, R., “Determinants of economic growth: a cross-country empirical study,” NBER 
Working Paper No. w5698, 1996. 
Baum, Christopher F, An Introduction to Modern Econometrics Using Stata. Stata Press, 
College Station, Texas, 2006.  
Bekaert, G. and C. Harvey, “Capital flows and the behavior of emerging market equity 
returns,” NBER Working Paper No. w6669, 1998.  
Bekaert, Geert, and Campbell R. Harvey, "Foreign speculators and emerging equity 
markets," Journal of Finance, 55, 565-613, 2000. 
 92 
 
Bekaert, G., C. Harvey, and C. Lundblad, "Emerging equity markets and economic 
development," Journal of development Economics, 66, 465-504, 2001. 
Bekaert, G., C.Harvey, and C. Lundblad, “Equity market liberalization in emerging 
markets,” Journal of Financial Research, 26, 275-299, 2003. 
Bekaert, G., C. Harvey, and C. Lundblad, “Does financial liberalization spur growth?” 
Journal of Financial economics, 77, 3-55, 2005. 
Bekaert, G., C. Harvey, and C. Lundblad, “Growth volatility and financial 
liberalization,” Journal of international money and finance, 25, 370-403, 2006. 
Ben Naceur, S., S. Ghazouani, and M. Omran, “Does stock market liberalization spur 
financial and economic development in the MENA region?” Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 36, 673-693, 2008. 
Ben Gamra, S., “Does financial liberalization matter for emerging East Asian 
economies growth? Some new evidence.” International Review of Economics & 
Finance, 18, 392-403, 2009. 
Bhaskar, V., "Sex selection and gender balance." American Economic Journal: 
Microeconomics, 3, 214-244, 2011. 
Bjorklund, A. and M. Jantti, “Intergenerational income mobility in Sweden compared to 
the United States,” American Economic Review, 1009-1018, 1997. 
Bjorklund, A., J. Roine, and D. Waldenström, “Intergenerational top income mobility in 
Sweden: Capitalist dynasties in the land of equal opportunity?” Journal of Public 
Economics, 96, 474-484, 2012. 
Bonfiglioli, A., and C. Mendicino, “Financial liberalization, banking crises and growth: 
assessing the links,” SSE/EFI working paper No. 567, 2004. 
Bratberg, E., Ø. Nilsen, and K. Vaage, “Intergenerational earnings mobility in Norway: 
Levels and trends,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 107, 419-435, 2005. 
Brown, Philip H., Erwin Bulte, and Xiaobo Zhang, "Positional spending and status 
seeking in rural China," Journal of Development Economics 96, 139-149, 2011. 
Bulte, Erwin, Nico Heerink, and Xiaobo Zhang, "China's One‐Child Policy and ‘the 
Mystery of Missing Women’: Ethnic Minorities and Male‐Biased Sex Ratios," Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 73, 21-39, 2011. 
Bumann, S., N. Hermes, and R. Lensink, “Financial liberalization and economic growth: 
A meta-analysis,” Journal of International Money and Finance, 33, 255-281, 2013. 
 93 
 
Cajueiro, D., P. Gogas, and B. Tabak, “Does financial market liberalization increase the 
degree of market efficiency? The case of the Athens stock exchange,” International 
Review of Financial Analysis, 18, 50-57, 2009. 
Case, Anne, Anu Garrib, Alicia Menendez, and Analia Olgiati. (2013). "Paying the 
piper: The high cost of funerals in South Africa." Economic Development and Cultural 
Change Vol. 62(1): 1-20. 
Cavallo, E., S. Galiani, I. Noy and J. Pantano, "Catastrophic natural disasters and 
economic growth," Review of Economics and Statistics 95, 1549-1561, 2013. 
Chai, Andreas and Wolfhard Kaus, “Signalling to whom? Conspicuous spending and 
the local density of the social group income distribution.” Working Paper No. 1218. 
Papers on Economics and Evolution, 2012. 
Charles, Kerwin Kofi, Erik Hurst, and Nikolai Roussanov, "Conspicuous Consumption 
and Race," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124, 425-467, 2009. 
Chen, Xi, Ravi Kanbur, and Xiaobo Zhang, "Peer effects, risk pooling, and status 
seeking: What explains gift spending escalation in rural China?" Working Paper, 2012. 
Choe, H., B.Kho, and R. Stulz, “Do foreign investors destabilize stock markets? The 
Korean experience in 1997,” Journal of Financial Economics, 54, 227-264, 1999. 
Corak, M. and A. Heisz, “The intergenerational earnings and income mobility of 
Canadian men: Evidence from longitudinal income tax data,” Journal of Human 
Resources, 504-533, 1999. 
Couch, K. and T. Dunn, “Intergenerational correlations in labor market status: A 
comparison of the United States and Germany,” Journal of Human Resources, 210-232, 
1997. 
Cuong, N., “Which covariates should be controlled in propensity score matching? 
Evidence from a simulation study,” Statistica Neerlandica, 67, 169-180, 2013. 
Das, M., and S. Mohapatra, “Income inequality: the aftermath of stock market 
liberalization in emerging markets,” Journal of Empirical Finance, 10, 217-248, 2003. 
Dearden, L., S. Machin, and H. Reed, “Intergenerational mobility in Britain,” Economic 
Journal, 47-66, 1997. 
Dehejia, R. and S. Wahba, “Propensity score-matching methods for nonexperimental 
causal studies,” Review of Economics and statistics, 84, 151-161, 2002. 
Devereux, M. and G. Smith, “International risk sharing and economic 
growth,” International Economic Review 535-550, 1994. 
 94 
 
Dube, A. and B. Zipperer, "Pooling Multiple Case Studies Using Synthetic Controls: 
An Application to Minimum Wage Policies," IZA Discussion Paper No. 8944, 2015. 
Dunn, C., “The intergenerational transmission of lifetime earnings: Evidence from 
Brazil,” BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 7, 2007. 
Eide, E. and M. Showalter, “Factors affecting the transmission of earnings across 
generations: A quantile regression approach,” Journal of Human Resources, 253-267, 
1999. 
Fan, Y., J. Yi, and J. Zhang, “Intergenerational mobility in China: Patterns and 
determinants,” working paper presented at Conference on the Study of Inequality in 
China, Beijing, 17 June, 2013. 
Feng, Suwei, and Qiang Li, "Car Ownership Control in Chinese Mega Cities: Shanghai, 
Beijing and Guangzhou," Journeys, September, 40-49, 2013 
Fuchs-Schündeln, N. and N. Funke, "Stock market liberalizations: Financial and 
macroeconomic implications," Review of world economics, 139, 730-761, 2003. 
Galindo, A., F. Schiantarelli, and A. Weiss, “Does financial liberalization improve the 
allocation of investment?: Micro-evidence from developing countries,” Journal of 
Development Economics, 83, 562-587, 2007. 
Gong, H., A. Leigh, and X. Meng, “Intergenerational income mobility in urban 
China,” Review of Income and Wealth, 58, 481-503, 2012. 
Grawe, N., "Intergenerational mobility for whom? The experience of high-and low-
earning sons in international perspective," in M. Corak (eds), Generational income 
mobility in North America and Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 58-89, 
2004. 
Grier, R and K. Grier, "On the real effects of inflation and inflation uncertainty in 
Mexico," Journal of Development Economics, 80, 478-500, 2006. 
Grier, K and R. Grier, “Only income diverges: A neoclassical anomaly.” Journal of 
Development Economics, 84, 25-45, 2007. 
Grinblatt, Mark, Matti Keloharju, and Seppo Ikäheimo, "Social influence and 
consumption: Evidence from the automobile purchases of neighbors," Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 90, 735-753, 2008. 
Guilmoto, Christophe Z, "Skewed sex ratios at birth and future marriage squeeze in 
China and India, 2005–2100," Demography 49, 77-100, 2012. 
Guo, C. and W. Min, “Education and Intergenerational Income Mobility in Urban 
China,” Frontiers of Education in China, 3, 22-44, 2008 (In Chinese). 
 95 
 
Gustafsson, B., “The degree and pattern of income immobility in Sweden,” Review of 
Income and Wealth, 40, 67-86, 1994. 
Haider, S. and G. Solon, “Life-cycle variation in the association between current and 
lifetime earnings,” NBER Working Paper No. W11943, 2006. 
Hassan, A., "Financial integration of stock markets in the Gulf: A multivariate 
cointegration analysis." International Journal of Business, 8, 335-346, 2003. 
Heffetz, Ori, “A test of conspicuous consumption: Visibility and income elasticities,” 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 93, 1101-1117, 2011. 
Henry, P., “Stock market liberalization, economic reform, and emerging market equity 
prices,” Journal of Finance, 55, 529-564, 2000a. 
________, “Do stock market liberalizations cause investment booms?” Journal of 
Financial economics, 58, 301-334, 2000b. 
Hermes, N., and R. Lensink, “Does financial liberalization influence saving, investment 
and economic growth? Evidence from 25 emerging market economies, 1973-96,” No. 
2005/69. Research Paper, UNU-WIDER, United Nations University (UNU), 2005. 
Hopkins, Ed, and Tatiana Kornienko, "Running to keep in the same place: consumer 
choice as a game of status," American Economic Review, 94, 1085-1107, 2004. 
Hung, J., “Deregulation and liberalization of the Chinese stock market and the 
improvement of market efficiency,” Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49, 
843-857, 2009. 
Iwata, S. and S. Wu, “Stock market liberalization and international risk 
sharing.” Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 19, 461-
476, 2009. 
Jaleel, F. and L. Samarakoon, “Stock market liberalization and return volatility: 
Evidence from the emerging market of Sri Lanka,” Journal of Multinational Financial 
Management, 19, 409-423, 2009. 
Jantti, M. and E. Osterbacka, “How much of the variance in income can be attributed to 
family        background? Evidence from Finland,” Unpublished working paper, 1999. 
Jarvis, S. and S. Jenkins, “How much income mobility is there in Britain?” Economic 
Journal, 428-443, 1998. 
Jayasuriya, S., “Stock market liberalization and volatility in the presence of favorable 
market characteristics and institutions,” Emerging Markets Review, 6, 170-191, 2005. 
Kaus, Wolfhard, “Conspicuous consumption and “race”: Evidence from South Africa,” 
Journal of Development Economics, 100, 63-73, 2013. 
 96 
 
Kawakatsu, H. and M. Morey, “Financial liberalization and stock market efficiency: an 
empirical examination of nine emerging market countries,” Journal of Multinational 
Financial Management, 9, 353-371, 1999. 
Kaya, I., K. Lyubimov, and M. Miletkov, “To liberalize or not to liberalize: Political 
and economic determinants of financial liberalization,” Emerging Markets Review, 13, 
78-99, 2012. 
Kim, B. and L. Kenny, "Explaining when developing countries liberalize their financial 
equity markets," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 17, 
387-402, 2007. 
Kouretas, G and M. Syllignakis, "Switching Volatility in Emerging Stock Markets and 
Financial Liberalization: Evidence from the new EU Member Countries," Central 
European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, 4, 65-93, 2012. 
Lefranc, A. and A. Trannoy, “Intergenerational earnings mobility in France: Is France 
more mobile than the US?” Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 57-77, 2005. 
Levine, R., “Bank-based or market-based financial systems: which is better?” Journal 
of financial intermediation, 11, 398-428, 2002. 
Lu, B., “Propensity Score Matching with Time Dependent Covariates,” Biometrics, 61, 
721-728, 2005. 
Manova, K., “Credit constraints, equity market liberalizations and international 
trade,” Journal of International Economics, 76, 33-47, 2008. 
Mazumder, B., “Fortunate sons: New estimates of intergenerational mobility in the 
United States using social security earnings data,” Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 87, 235-255, 2005. 
Mitton, T., “Stock market liberalization and operating performance at the firm 
level,” Journal of Financial Economics, 81, 625-647, 2006. 
Manova, K., "Credit constraints, equity market liberalizations and international 
trade," Journal of International Economics, 76, 33-47, 2008. 
Mansur, A. and F. Delgado (eds), Stock Market Developments in the Countries of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
Moav, Omer, and Zvika Neeman, "Status and poverty," Journal of the European 
Economic Association, 8, 413-420, 2010. 
____________________________, "Saving Rates and Poverty: The Role of 
Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital," Economic Journal, 122, 933-956, 
2012. 
 97 
 
O’Connor, T., “Equity market liberalization and firm growth,” Review of Development 
Finance, 3, 1-12, 2013. 
Osterbacka, E., “Family background and economic status in Finland,” Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, 103, 467-484, 2001. 
Osterberg, T., “Intergenerational Income Mobility in Sweden: What do Tax-data 
Show?” Review of Income and Wealth, 46, 421-436, 2000. 
Qian, Nancy, "Missing Women and the Price of Tea in China: The Effect of Sex-
Specific Earnings on Sex Imbalance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123, 1251-
1285, 2008. 
Ranciere, R, A. Tornell, and F. Westermann, “Decomposing the effects of financial 
liberalization: Crises vs. growth,” Journal of Banking & Finance, 30, 3331-3348, 2006. 
Pascual, M., “Intergenerational income mobility: The transmission of socio-economic 
status in Spain,” Journal of Policy Modeling, 31, 835-846, 2009. 
Piraino, P., “Comparable estimates of intergenerational income mobility in Italy,” BE 
Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 7, 2007. 
Rosenbaum, P. and D. Rubin, “The central role of the propensity score in observational 
studies for causal effects,” Biometrika, 70, 41-55, 1983. 
Rosenbaum, P. and D. Rubin. “Constructing a control group using multivariate matched 
sampling methods that incorporate the propensity score,” The American Statistician, 39, 
33-38, 1985. 
Rubin, D. and N. Thomas, "Matching using estimated propensity scores: relating theory 
to practice," Biometrics, 249-264, 1996. 
Shi, X., J. Nuetah, and X. Xin, “Household income mobility in rural China: 1989–
2006,” Economic Modelling, 27, 1090-1096, 2010. 
Solon, G., “Intergenerational income mobility in the United States,” American 
Economic Review, 393-408, 1992. 
________, “Cross-country differences in intergenerational earnings mobility,” Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 16, 59-66, 2002. 
Stiglitz, J., “Capital market liberalization, economic growth, and instability,” World 
development, 28, 1075-1086, 2000. 
Ufier, A., “Quasi-experimental analytical on the effects of adoption of a value added 
tax,” Economic Inquiry, 52, 1364-1379, 2014. 
 98 
 
Wang, H., Research on Income Distribution and Mobility in China, Sun Yat-sen 
University Press, Guangzhou, 2007 (In Chinese). 
Wei, Shang-Jin, and Xiaobo Zhang, "The Competitive Saving Motive: Evidence from 
Rising Sex Ratios and Savings Rates in China," Journal of Political Economy, 119, 
511-564, 2011. 
Wei, Shang-Jin, Xiaobo Zhang, and Yin Liu, “Status competition and housing prices,” 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. w18000, 2012. 
Yuan, Z. and C. Lin, “The Trend and Mechanism of Intergenerational Income Mobility 
in China: An Analysis from the Perspective of Human Capital, Social Capital and 
Wealth,” World Economy, 36, 880-898, 2013. 
Zimmerman, D., “Regression toward mediocrity in economic stature,” American 
Economic Review, 409-429, 1992. 
 
